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ABSTRACT
Differences of opinion exist in the literature 
regarding the relationship between changes in tax policy 
and changes in the value of firms' capital stock. The 
purpose of this study was twofold. One aim was to 
determine whether the real estate capital markets react to 
public information regarding proposed or actual changes in 
tax law. The second and primary objective was to test the 
traditional economic theory that a direct relationship 
exists between changes in tax law and the value of the 
firm. Changes in cost recovery rules for real property 
and in corporate tax rates were the tax provisions of 
interest in this research project.
The study was conducted using stock return data for 
real estate firms over the years 1981-1987. The test 
periods were those months when new information regarding 
proposed and actual tax reform provisions were publicly 
announced. Regular corporations, real estate investment 
trusts, and master limited partnerships were the 
organizational forms included in the sample. The firms 
were also classified as to their functional form, either 
as building and development firms, property investment 
firms, mortgage investment- firms, . or hybrid investment
vii
firms. Based on their organizational and functional 
forms, the firms were grouped into certain portfolios.
An intervention time series model was used to 
determine whether the portfolios earned excess returns 
during the test periods. In order to examine whether the 
real estate markets react to the new tax law information, 
ordinary least squares regression techniques were 
employed, and two-step full transformation procedures were 
c a r r i e d  out to c o r r e c t  for o c c u r r e n c e s  of 
autoregressivity. Generalized least squares regression 
techniques were used for testing the economic theory 
regarding the relationship between tax policy and the 
value of the firm.
The results indicate that the real estate markets do 
react to announcements concerning changes in tax policy. 
However, only minimal support was found for the economic 




In 1986, Congress legislated sweeping changes of the 
tax law for individuals and businesses. One of the 
ostensible objectives of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 
186)1 is to encourage business and personal decision­
making based on sound economic choices rather than on tax 
results. Many provisions of TRA *86 are directed toward 
this end.2 A number of tax preferences have been 
eliminated from the tax code and others restricted. Some 
of the legislative changes have broad-reaching 
implications while others are industry or entity specific. 
Real estate is expected to be particularly affected by TRA 
'86 and is the industry of interest in this study.
^Unless otherwise stated, TRA *86 and Act refer to 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Public Law 99-514, October 
1986. The term "Code'1 and statutory provisions refer to 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
2See e.g., P.L. 99-514, Sec. 211, eliminating the 
regular investment tax credit which discriminates against 
long-lived investments; Sec. 401 - 405, eliminating tax 
incentives that led to excessive investments in 
agricultural tax shelters by non-farmers; and Sec. 501, 
limiting the use of losses and credits from passive 
activities.
1
Contrary to a number of federal tax acts in the 
past, TRA '86 was intended neither to stimulate investment 
in the economy nor to rein inflation. Although some 
economists (e.g., Weidenbaum (1986)) believe that TRA '86
will result in a considerable down-turn in new investments 
and a consequent economic decline, the actual micro- and 
macro-economic impact of the new tax law is not yet known. 
Unfortunately, the various models that have been used to 
predict the effects of tax legislative changes do not 
yield consistent results.
This research uses stock market data to test 
theorized effects of TRA '86 on the real estate capital 
markets. Of further interest in this study is the
differential impact the tax legislation has had on the 
various entity forms and functional forms of real estate 
activities due to the differences in tax law changes
across these groups.
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of
the study. First, contributions of the research are 
considered. Second, certain TRA *86 provisions related to 
the taxation of real estate activities are summarized. 
Third, the theoretical underpinnings of the study are 
examined. Fourth, the research questions are addressed, 
followed by a summary of the research methods to be used 
in answering the research questions. Limitations and 
implicit assumptions of the study are then discussed. The
final section of the chapter discusses the relationship 
between tax law and accounting data.
Significance of Study
Uncertainty regarding the economic effects of tax 
legislation has plagued investors, managers, economists, 
and other decision makers. Theoretical models that 
attempt to specify the nature, direction, and magnitude of 
the impact of new tax legislation are often at odds with 
each other. Empirical verification of tax change effects 
is useful for determining the validity of particular 
economic models and for gaining new insight into market 
reactions to such changes. Moreover, an examination of 
the differential impact on various entity and functional 
forms of businesses will provide information for 
evaluating tax legislation which is directed toward a 
particular business entity or function.
Taxation of Real Estate
Real Estate Classifications. In order to consider 
the relationship between certain provisions of TRA '86 and 
the real estate industry, it is necessary to 
differentiate and classify the various entity forms and 
functional activity forms under which the industry 
operates. The term "entity form" relates to the 
organizational structure of the firm; the term "functional 
activity form" relates to the nature of real estate
activity in which the firm engages. This discussion 
focuses only on the entity and functional activity forms 
used in this study. These are summarized in Table 1.1.
TABLE l.l 









Entities engaged in real estate activities may be 
organized as corporations, real estate investment trusts 
(REITs), partnerships, or sole proprietorships. Earnings 
of regular corporations are taxed at the entity level, and 
earnings distributed to shareholders are again subject to 
taxation at the shareholder level. (Earnings of S 
corporations pass through to the shareholders and 
generally are taxed only at the shareholder level.) REITs 
generally are not taxed on earnings distributed to 
shareholders, and those earnings are subject to taxation 
only to the shareholders. However, losses are retained by
the REIT to be used to offset subsequent earnings. 
Partnerships are not taxed on their earnings but both 
earnings and losses of a partnership generally pass 
through to the partners. The individual partners are 
subject to taxation on the partnership income. Sole 
proprietors are, of course, taxed as individuals on their 
earnings. Because of data availability limitations, S 
corporations and sole proprietors are not considered in 
this study. For the same reason, only a limited number of 
parterships are included in the research.
The tax law also may affect real estate firms 
differently depending on the functional type of activity 
in which they are engaged. Functional activity 
classifications include equity investors, mortgage 
investors, hybrid investors, and builders/developers. 
Equity investors generally hold real property for the 
production of rental income. Mortgage investors own 
mortgages secured by real estate, and hybrid investors 
hold both income-producing property and real estate 
mortgages. Builders/developers generally own real 
property for resale. Certain provisions of the tax law 
may not have the same effect on these various real estate 
functional activities.
Changes in Real Estate Taxation Under TRA *86. A 
number of provisions of TRA *86 relate directly to the 
real estate industry, and others impact the industry
through their application to particular entity forms that 
deal primarily with real estate or to earnings derived 
from real estate activities. Provisions of TRA '86 that 
relate directly or indirectly to real estate include 
depreciation of structures, production period interest, 
passive activity rules3 , corporate and individual tax
rates, and REIT provisions. Each of these is reviewed 
briefly here, and those changes specifically related to 
this study are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
One major provision of TRA '86 is the change in 
depreciation rules for structures. The method required 
for recovering the cost of buildings placed into service 
after 1986 is the straight line method applied generally 
over 27.5 or 31.5 years depending on the class of real 
property (sec. 168(c)). In contrast, buildings placed 
into service after 1980 but before 1987 generally are 
depreciated using 175 percent declining balance over a
period of 15, 18, or 19 years, depending on the year in
which the asset was placed into service. Various
accelerated depreciation methods may be used for 
structures placed into service before 1981 depending on 
the building's classification and the year in which it was 
placed into service (sec. 167(j) and reg. secs. 1.167(j)-l
3 In general, a passive activity is any trade or 
business in which the taxpayer does not materially 
participate, any rental activity, and any limited 
partnership interest (sec. 469(a)).
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et seq.). Consequently, the depreciation rules of TRA '86 
allow a much slower write-off of newly acquired or 
constructed structures than for real estate placed into 
service prior to 1987. This provision relates primarily 
to real estate firms that derive earnings from owning 
rental property.
TRA '86 also repeals the provision that interest 
costs and property taxes incurred during construction of 
commercial and residential structures may be amortized 
over a period shorter than the depreciable life of the 
asset. Pursuant to section 263A, taxpayers who self­
construct depreciable real property for use in a trade or 
business, or in an activity for profit, now generally must 
capitalize amounts paid for interest and property taxes 
during the period of construction and depreciate the cost 
over the applicable recovery period for the related 
building. Prior to 1986, taxpayers were required to 
amortize these costs over a period of 10 years. Thus, the 
recovery period for such costs has been lengthened from 10 
years to 27.5 or 31.5 years.
A third provision directed toward the real estate 
industry is the classification of rental activities as 
passive activities (sec. 469(c)(2)). The significance of 
this provision is that under section 469 taxpayers 
generally may not use net passive losses to offset income 
from other sources. Unused passive activity losses may be
carried forward, however, and used in subsequent years to 
offset passive income. The use of passive losses to 
offset income from other sources had been a major element 
of certain real estate tax shelter investments.
A major provision of TRA '86 relating to
corporations is the new corporate tax rate schedule. 
Prior to TRA ’86, the top marginal corporate rate was 46 
percent. By contrast, the top marginal tax rate effective 
July 1, 1987 is 34 percent (sec. 11(b)). This reduction 
in tax rates translates into a 26 percent decrease in the 
top marginal corporate tax rate.4
REITs also were targeted by TRA *86. REITs are
entities that receive most of their earnings from owning 
either income producing real property or real estate 
mortgages. Certain requirements must be met for the
distributed earnings of REITs to be exempt from taxation 
at the entity level. The requirements relate to the 
organizational structure, the source of income, the nature 
of the assets, and distribution of income. TRA '86
relaxed a number of these requirements to allow REITs 
greater flexibility in conducting their business (secs. 
856, 857, 859, and 4981).
4 The top stated marginal tax bracket for individuals 
was reduced from 50 percent to 28 percent (sec. 1).
Theoretical Issues
The effective rate at which capital is taxed and the 
timing of deductions are theorized to have a significant 
impact on the investment behavior at the entity level 
(Hall and Jorgenson 1967). However, disagreement exists 
concerning the effects of investment incentives or 
disincentives on the value of a firm's capital stock. Two 
opposing theories are of interest. The traditional 
theory, viz., the theory more commonly accepted by tax 
policy makers, posits an increase in the market value of 
the firm in response to investment incentives. An 
opposing theory presented by Feldstein (1981) and Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff (1983) , which will be referred to in this 
study as the F-A-K theory, holds that the firm's market 
value decreases when investment incentives are present. 
Each theory is considered separately? then a discussion of 
Lyon's model, which partially reconciles the two theories, 
is presented.
The F-A-K Theory. The F-A-K theory holds that tax
legislation that affects newly-acquired capital 
differently from old capital alters the relative market 
values of the two types of capital. For example, when 
depreciation methods for tax purposes are changed, the new 
rules generally apply only to assets acquired subsequent 
to the effective date of the new legislation and not to 
existing assets. The F-A-K theory proposes that faster
10
write-off of new assets lowers the firm’s net cost of 
purchasing such assets. Consequently, in a competitive 
market the value of existing assets is driven down and the 
market value of the firm reduced. As long as the supply 
curve for new assets has a positive slope, this theory may 
be applied in a symmetrical manner to changes in tax 
policy that increase the cost of purchasing or owning new 
assets.
A number of authors have criticized the F-A-K 
theory. Boadway and Wildasin (1984, p. 405) note that 
comparative static analysis, such as that put forth by the 
F-A-K theory, is not very useful for examining the process 
of movement from one steady state equilibrium to another 
because it gives no recognition to adjustment costs in its 
assessment of the relationship between tax policy and 
capital investments. A number of authors, including 
Eisner and Strotz (1963), Lucus (1967), and Mussa (1977), 
believe that the costs of adjusting to new levels of 
capital prevent the immediate adjustment in the value of 
existing capital. By omitting cost adjustment and time 
lag factors, the F-A-K theory ignores windfall profits or 
losses to holders of existing capital when tax policy 
changes. Chamley (1985) emphasizes that the entire path 
of future decisions should be considered when examining 
changes in tax policy.
The Traditional Theory. The traditional theory 
holds that investment incentives, such as accelerated 
depreciation, tax credits, and reduced tax rates for 
business, increase the value of the firm and the value of 
its common stock. The model explaining the relationship 
between changes in tax policy and the market value of the 
firm is predicated on the assumption that the firm 
attempts to maximize profit. Firms will continue to 
increase their investments in capital assets until the 
cost of the investments is equal to the net present value 
of future after-tax cash flows resulting from those 
investments. According to analyses conducted by Hall and 
Jorgenson (1967, 1971) and Abel (1982), changes in tax
laws that provide investment incentives in the form of 
rapid depreciation, investment tax credits, or lower tax 
rates reduce the firm's cost of investments and increase 
the overall profitability of the firm by lowering the 
after-tax cost of capital assets. since the market value 
of a firm's capital stock is a function of the market's 
expectations regarding future earnings of the firm, the 
value of the firm's equity shares increases.
Since investors value the equity of a firm based on 
expectations of earnings attributable to both existing 
assets and all predicted future investments, tax policy 
changes regarding investment incentives result in 
corresponding adjustments of investors' expectations.
12
Under the traditional theory, when investment incentives 
are removed from the tax law, investors will make a 
downward adjustment in their expectation of the firm's 
future investment plans and future profitability. 
Consequently, a downward adjustment in the market value of 
the firm's capital stock would likewise occur.
Lvon's Model
Lyon (198 6) notes that market competition, a 
driving force in the F-A-K theory, is absent from the 
classical theory. The mechanism in the F-A-K theory that 
allows increased (decreased) investments by some firms to 
decrease (increase) the profit of other firms is not 
allowed to operate in the traditional model analysis. 
Lyon expanded the traditional theory, which recognizes
cost adjustment and time lag, to include the forces of 
market competition. Lyon's model can be useful in 
analyzing the impact of certain TRA '86 changes on the 
real estate capital markets: slower rate of cost recovery 
for newly-acquired real estate and lower tax rates for
corporations.
Research Questions
This study investigates empirically the differential 
impact of TRA '86 on the various functional forms and
entity forms of real estate organizations. Although many 
provisions of TRA '86 discussed in this chapter are
)
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expected to have some effect on the industry, the tax law 
changes of greatest interest to this research are those 
involving (1) depreciation requirements, and (2) the 
corporate tax rate changes. The manner in which TRA ’86 
affects real estate is investigated by examining these two 
interrelated issues. More specifically, this study will 
attempt to answer the following primary question:
Are the real estate capital markets9 responses to 
changes in the tax law consistent with those 
predicted by the traditional theory?
In order to answer the general question, three 
specific questions are proposed.
(1) Do the real estate capital markets react to 
publicly-available information concerning 
proposed or actual changes in the tax law?
(2) Does a change to straight line depreciation and 
longer recovery periods for real property 
result in an overall decrease in the market 
value of firms engaged in holding income- 
producing property relative to those engaged in 
other real estate activities?
(3) Does a decrease in corporate tax rates result 
in an increase in the market value of real 
estate corporations relative to other real 
estate entities, such as REITs and MLPs, that 
generally are not taxed at the entity level?
Methodological Issues
Stock market data is used to examine the effect that 
announcements regarding tax law changes have had on share
14
prices. Stock prices have been determined to be an 
unbiased estimator of the value of the firm's future cash 
flows (Fama 1976). According to the efficient market / 
rational expectation hypothesis (Dyckman and Morse 1986, 
p. 5), all available information is incorporated 
instantaneously into the price of market securities. The 
equilibrium price in the market is that price which 
equates the supply of a firm's equity securities with 
their demand, and is set by a consensus of traders in the 
capital markets.
Under the semi-strong form of market efficiency, the 
consensus which sets the price of equity shares is based 
on all relevant public information. When new information 
becomes available to the public, it immediately is 
incorporated into the new price of the equity shares. 
Thus, by determining the magnitude and direction of 
changes in share prices around the announcement dates 
concerning TRA '86, the effects of the Act on the real 
estate capital markets can be examined.
Time Period and Data. The test periods for this 
study are those months when significant new information 
regarding TRA '86 reached the market. From August, 1982 
when the Bradley-Gephardt tax overhaul plan was introduced 
until TRA '86 was signed into law in October, 1986, and 
thereafter, several important announcements concerning 
TRA '86 were made public. Data over the period from
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January 1, 1981 through December 31, 1987 will be
analyzed. January 1, 1981 was selected as the beginning
of the data time period because it represents the 
beginning of a reasonably stable period of time relative 
to tax legislation affecting real estate. Using data from 
January, 1981 forward allows the regression relation 
between overall market returns and returns in the real 
estate capital markets to be established for the time 
series before the occurrence of the announcements
regarding TRA '86.
Monthly returns, computed by compounding daily
returns, are used for analysis. To determine when 
information became publicly available, a search of The 
Wall Street Journal was conducted for announcements
concerning the Act.
Sample Selection. The sample of firms used in this 
study were chosen from the population of publicly-traded 
entities engaged in real estate activities. The firm 
sample is made up of regular corporations and non­
corporation firms, specifically REITs and master limited 
partnerships (MLPs). Only entities meeting the following 
requirements are included in the sample:
1. The firm must be listed on the American or New 
York stock exchange.
2. The firm must have at least 12 consecutive 
monthly returns during the sample period.
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3. The firm must have tax status continuity during 
its 12-month period of consecutive returns.
4. The firm must have data available in the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily 
stock return files.
The tax status of the sample entities will be verified for 
each year of inclusion through Moody’s. The purpose of 
the tax continuity requirement is to prevent possible 
contamination of the results by effects of tax status 
changes on the market value of firm equity.
The firms meeting the requirements for inclusion in 
the sample will be grouped into portfolios, the 
composition of which will vary depending on the research 
question to be addressed. Entity and functional activity 
classifications as shown in Table l.l are used for 
p o r t f o l i o  g r o u p i n g .  R e a l  e s t a t e  a c t i v i t y
classifications, as designated by the Realty Stock Review 
and SIC codes, were used to facilitate grouping sample 
firms into functional classifications. Firms which cannot 
be clearly classified because of diversification or lack 
of information availability will be eliminated from the 
sample.
The Model. The statistical model to be used in this 
study is an expanded market model. The market model 
(Sharpe 1964, and Lintner 1965) posits that capital 
assets will be priced by the market such that
17
(1.1) E(ri) = rf + [E(r^) - rf]
where:
= the return to security i 
rf = the risk-free rate of return 
rjj, = the market return
p i = cov(ri,rjii)/var (rjjj) , described as the systematic 
risk of security i
E = expectation operator.
Expected return includes expectations about both 
dividends and capital gains. The model assumes that when 
the market is in equilibrium, the risk-adjusted rate of 
return is equal for all securities. However, in the event 
of some intervention in the return-generating process, 
abnormal returns may result for certain securities. This 
study adds dummy variables to the market model and uses 
ordinary least squares and seemingly unrelated regression 
techniques in order to examine the effect of interventions 
in the real estate capital markets.
Following the methodology suggested by Schwert 
(1981) and Larcker, Gordon, and Pinches (1980), and 
subsequently used by Chen and Sanger (1984), Binder 
(1985), Lyon (1986), and Sanger (1986, 1987), this study
employs the technique of intervention analysis to examine 
the markets' reactions to information leading to the 
enactment of TRA '86. Intervention analysis is a 
regression technique using dummy variables representing
"some specified set of interventions that may change the 
nature or level of the return from the time series . . ." 
(Schwert, p. 272) . Its use is appropriate when some 
economic event, such as a change in tax law, is believed 
to cause a change in the return-generating process of 
securities. Larcker, Gordon, and Pinches (1980) suggest 
that intervention analysis is preferable to cumulative 
average residual methodology for analyzing stock market 
reactions to financial announcements because it allows for 
changes in the measure of systematic risk of the sample 
firms.
Two different intervention dummy variables are added 
to the market model for this study. Shift dummy 
variables, Ds , are added to the model to specify a 
permanent change in a and/or (3, and a switching regression 
technique is employed for identifying the point at which 
such change occurred. The purpose of identifying a shift 
in the r e gr es si on relation is to avoid model 
misspecification and to obtain a better fit of the 
regression line. An information dummy variable, Dj^/ is 
added for specifying months in the time series in which 
interventions may have occurred. The coefficient of the 
information dummy variable, captures the abnormal
returns in those months when information about TRA *86 
became publicly available.
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In the presence of announcements concerning
impending changes in the tax law that may affect real 
estate portfolio returns, the market model corresponding 
to Equation 1.1 may be respecified as
Rpt = the stochastic return on portfolio p in time 
period t
Rmt = the stochastic return on the value weighted
index of NYSE and AMEX stocks in time period t
otp = the regression constant or intercept of 
portfolio p before the intervention
Up = the shift in the regression intercept of 
portfolio p due to the intervention
/?p = the systematic risk coefficient of portfolio p
before the intervention
= the shift in the systematic risk coefficient 
of portfolio p due to the intervention
(1.2) Rpt = ap + apDs + /3pRmt + ^pDsRmt
K
+ E <SpkDIkt + eptk=l
where
Ds = shift dummy variable = f0 before the shift1 after the shift
1 in infor 
mation
Dikt= information dummy variable I month k, ^  but only 
if t = k
0 otherwise
5pk - coefficient of information dummy variable DIkt 
for portfolio p
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K = number of months in which information
concerning TRA '86 is publicly announced, 
where k ranges over those months, and only 
those months, during which such information is 
publicly announced.
ePt = the stochastic error term for portfolio p at 
time t.
Switching Regression Techniques. Proposed tax 
legislation may result in a fundamental change in the
return generating process over the sample period for real 
estate firms. To estimate the coefficients of the 
intervention Equation 1.2, it is necessary to determine 
whether such a change occurred in the model parameters, 
and if so, to identify the point in the time series of
returns at which the shift occurred. For example,
assuming no fundamental change in the time series 
returns, the regression line would remain unchanged as 
shown in Figure 1.1(a). However, if some event, e.g., a 
change in tax law, were to cause a shift in the model 
parameters, the slope and/or the intercept of the 
regression line would not be constant over the entire time 
series. Figure 1.1(b) shows an example where a shift
occurs at point t*. By identifying the shift date and 
fitting a regression line having two different slopes 
and/or intercepts, the model is specified more accurately 
and a better fit is obtained.




(a) No change in time series (b) Change in time series 
returns at time t* returns at time t*
t*
switch occurred, a switching regression technique will be 
used to determine if the regression equation switches from 
one regime to another. Moreover, if a switch occurs, the 
date (or month) of the switch must be identified. Quandt 
(1958, 1960) suggests that the shift in the regime can be 
identified through the use of maximum likelihood 
techniques whereby the time-frame is divided into two 
periods. One time period represents pre-shift (or pre­
intervention) ? the other period represents post-shift (or 
post-intervention). Separate regression coefficients are 
estimated for each time period. This technique allows the 
intervention point to vary so that the "best11 fit 
nonstationary ("kinked") regression line is found.
Switching regression techniques have been used in 
market studies by Sanger and Chen (1984), Sanger (1986),
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and Lyon (1986). These researchers found that the 
regression equation did in fact switch from one regime to 
another during the sample period.
Abnormal Returns. An information dummy variable, 
DIkt» included in the model to represent each month in 
which information regarding proposed tax law changes was 
publicly announced. For each month, k, in which the 
announcements reached the public, the dummy variable 
in Equation 1.2, representing such month, takes on a value 
equal to one. For t ^ k, its value is zero. The purpose 
of Spfc is to capture that part of the portfolio returns 
that is unique to information months and not explained by 
other terms in the model. Thus, is a measure of the
abnormal return on portfolio p in information month k.
Seemingly Unrelated Regression. The parameters of 
the model will be estimated by the use of regression. 
However, one of the assumptions of ordinary least squares 
regression is independent error terms. When all firms in 
the sample are from the same industry, the estimated 
coefficients may not be independent across firms. King 
(1966) identified positive contemporaneous cross­
correlation among returns of securities within the same 
industry. If the residuals ept in the intervention 
Equation 1.2 are not independent, the assumption of 
independence for ordinary least squares regression is 
violated. The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model,
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a generalized least squares regression technique, controls 
for cross-correlation by allowing for joint estimation of 
all firms (Theil 1971, p. 298-99). Since the number of 
observations in the time series used to estimate the 
regression equation must be greater than the number of 
coefficients, the firms in this study are grouped into 
portfolios.
Theil (1971, pp. 309-310) shows that joint estimates 
of the coefficients in the seemingly unrelated regression 
model yield the same values of the coefficients as do the 
ordinary lenst squares estimates. The advantage of SUR, 
however, is that the use of the full estimated covariance 
matrix from the joint regression for hypothesis testing 
corrects for contemporaneous cross-correlation among 
portfolios. Thus, SUR permits tests of hypotheses 
concerning portfolios of real estate firms, while 
recognizing the lack of independence across portfolios; 
the efficiency of the estimates is thereby improved.
SUR techniques are used in this study for estimating 
Equation 1.2. Dummy variables in the model are used to 
capture the results of interventions in the return- 
generating process. In order to answer the research 
questions, tests on the information dummy variable 
coefficients will be conducted.
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Hypotheses
The traditional theory suggests that the market 
reacts to those changes in the tax law that encourage, 
investment, increase deductions, or decrease the tax 
liability by making an upward adjustment in the value of 
the firm. Conversely, changes that provide investment 
disincentives, decrease deductions, or increase the tax 
liability cause a decrease in the value of the firm. 
Assuming market efficiency in the semi-strong form, any 
market adjustment would occur very quickly following 
public announcements regarding impending tax law changes. 
The following null hypotheses are presented for testing 
the real estate capital markets' reactions to 
announcements regarding TRA '86 and for determining 
whether the market behavior is consistent with the 
traditional theory.
HOI: No significant abnormal returns were earned by any
of the portfolios in any information month.
H02: No significant difference exists between abnormal
returns of the non-equity portfolio and those of 
the equity portfolio for any information month.
H03: No significant difference exists between abnormal
returns of the corporation portfolio and those of 
the non-corporation portfolio for any information 
month.
The first hypothesis attempts to test whether the 
real estate markets do in fact react to information
concerning tax policy changes. Hypothesis (2) is designed 
to test the markets1 reactions to the change in 
depreciation rules. The traditional theory would predict 
that the market would revise its expectation regarding new 
investments and growth in those firms that are impacted by 
the slower write-off of real estate. Consequently, over 
the test period, the negative abnormal returns of the 
equity portfolio would have a higher absolute value than 
those of the non-equity portfolio. The issue of the 
change in corporate tax rates is addressed by hypothesis 
(3) . The traditional theory predicts that the reduction 
in corporate tax rates would result in greater positive 
abnormal returns for the corporation portfolio than for 
the non-corporation portfolio. The purpose of the 
information coefficients, <Spfc, in intervention Equation 
1.2 is to capture the abnormal returns resulting at each 
market adjustment point. Therefore, tests of the 
coefficients, 5pjc» have been conducted with various 
portfolio compositions. The composition of the portfolios 
depends on the nature of the hypothesis under 
consideration. Rejection of any null hypothesis would 
indicate that the real estate markets made adjustments as 
a result of the tax law information. If the difference 
between the estimated abnormal returns of the portfolios 
is significant and of the predicted sign, the evidence 
would suggest that the behavior of the real estate capital
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markets is consistent with that predicted by the 
traditional theory with respect to the tax policy change 
in question. Any significant difference between portfolio 
returns not having the sign predicted by the traditional 
theory provides support for the F-A-K theory.
Assumptions and Limitations
This study is premised on two theoretical economic 
assumptions. One assumption is that the market operates 
efficiently. The second assumption is that the market
moves toward a new equilibrium following an event which 
creates disequilibrium in the economy. To the extent that 
these assumptions are not valid, the conclusions to be 
drawn from this study may be limited.
Another assumption made in the study relates to the 
degree of efficiency with which the market responds to new 
information. Abnormal returns resulting from each market 
adjustment are assumed to occur within the month of the 
information announcement. To the extent that the market 
reacts more slowly, the results may be biased.
The sample firms for this research are from the 
population of publiclv-traded real estate firms. 
Therefore, findings and conclusions of this study may not 
be generalizable to other firms in the real estate 
industry. Moreover, the results of this study cannot be 
extended to other industries.
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Relationship Between Accounting Data and Tax Law
Changes in the tax law often impact the income 
statement, the balance sheet, and the statement of cash 
flows. The revenue inflows received by a firm are 
allocated among the factors of income production. These 
factors include labor, materials, interest, and taxes. 
The portion not otherwise allocated is the net income of 
the firm and represents return on equity. Tax 
legislation that alters statutory tax rates generally 
causes a change in the effective tax rate applied to the 
income of the firm and changes the firm's after-tax net 
income as shown on the income statement. Since the net 
income of the firm flows through to the equity section of 
the balance sheet and the sources of funds on the
statement of cash flows, these financial statements also
are affected by changes in tax rates.
Changes in the tax law regarding the rate at which 
fixed assets are depreciated also impact on the financial 
statements. The differences between accounting 
depreciation and tax depreciation create deferred tax 
liabilities which are reflected in the balance sheet. To 
the extent that the payment of income taxes is deferred 
until a later period, a greater amount of funds is
available to the firm as working capital. The cash flow
statement reports this deferment as a source of funds.
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Summary
This chapter provides an overview of the entire 
dissertation. It discusses the need for the study, 
relevant provisions of TRA *86, theoretical issues to be 
considered, the research questions to be addressed, 
research methods to be used, and limitations and 
assumption of the study. A detailed discussion of each of 
the above topics is contained in the chapters that follow. 
Chapter 2 addresses theoretical and economic issues 
relating to taxation and capital markets. Chapter 3 
describes provisions of the TRA '86 relevant to this 
research that pertain directly or indirectly to real 
estate earnings. Chapter 4 presents the methodology to be 
used in the study, and Chapter 5 the results. The final 
chapter of this dissertation reports some conclusions 
derived from the findings of the study, discusses the 
limitations of the research, and suggests possible future 
research in areas related to this investigation.
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
A survey of the literature reveals several studies 
concerning the relationship between tax policy and capital 
markets. Relevant studies are presented in this chapter 
in three sections. First, a review of those studies 
concerned with economic theory and simulation of the 
impact of tax policy on capital markets is presented. 
Second, those studies that attempt to provide empirical 
evidence of the relationship between the capital markets 
and changes in tax policy are discussed. The final 
section in this chapter summarizes and analyzes the 
results of the studies in each of the above sections.
Theoretical and Simulation Studies
Within the framework of the neoclassical theory of 
optimal capital accumulation, Hall and Jorgenson (1967) 
studied the relationship between tax policy and investment 
expenditures in a partial equilibrium analysis. The 
neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation holds 
that the firms's objective is to maximize profits. 
Profits are defined as gross revenues less the cost of 
current inputs and the rental cost of capital inputs.
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The rental cost of capital is determined from the 
condition of market equilibrium whereby the value of an 
asset is equal to the sum of the discounted values of all 
capital services from the asset. To obtain optimum 
returns, the value of the marginal product of capital 
should be just equal to the rental cost of capital. 
Therefore, profit-maximizing firms will hold a level of 
capital stock which equates marginal product with the 
rental cost of capital.
In the Ha11-Jorgenson model, the level of desired 
capital is a function of the value of the output, the 
rental cost of capital inputs, and the elasticity of 
output with respect to capital input. The tax rules of 
interest in the study relate to the rate of cost recovery 
of capital assets and the amount of investment tax credit 
allowed on the purchase of assets. Changes in tax policy 
that alter either or both of these items ostensibly 
change the rental cost of capital assets. Consequently, 
the desired level of capital stock and the value of the 
firm change.
Hall and Jorgenson conducted a simulation analysis 
to estimate the magnitude of the effects of tax policy 
changes on capital investment. Using data for structures 
and equipment for both the farm and non-farm sectors of 
the U.S. economy for the years 1929 through 1963, they 
estimated changes in the level of net investments during
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periods of tax policy changes. These estimates were then 
compared with observed changes to evaluate the 
appropriateness of the model.
The results of the Hall and Jorgenson study indicate 
that the 1954 increase in the rate of depreciation on 
capital assets substantially impacted the level of capital 
investments, particularly investment in structures. Both 
estimated and observed levels of investments in structures 
showed a significant increase. Similar conclusions were 
drawn concerning the 1962 tax law changes that reduced the 
depreciable lives of equipment and machinery and instated 
the investment tax credit. The researchers determined 
that these tax law changes resulted in a significant 
increase in the level of investment in the affected 
classes of assets.
In a subsequent study, Hall and Jorgenson (1971) 
reestimated their econometric model of investment 
behavior, taking into account data which became available 
after their 1967 study was conducted. They obtained a new 
set of investment functions for the non-farm sector of the 
economy. Employing the same methodology, Hall and 
Jorgenson used the new set of investment functions to 
reexamine the impact of the various tax policy changes 
that they had studied in their earlier work. The 
conclusions drawn in this study about the impact of the
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1954 and 1962 tax law changes were substantially the same 
as those drawn in the 1967 work.
Hall and Jorgenson also examined the impact of the 
1964 investment tax credit increase from 6 percent to 10 
percent, and the suspension of the credit in 1966-67, 
coupled with a decrease in the rate of depreciation for 
structures. They concluded that the 1964 increase in the 
tax credit resulted in a sizable increase in capital 
investment in equipment. The suspension of the credit and 
the change in depreciation rules for structures resulted 
in a decline in investment spending for all classes of 
capital investments.
In both studies, Hall and Jorgenson concluded that 
tax policy can be a highly effective means of changing the 
level and timing of investment expenditures. They note 
that any change in tax policy which changes the rental 
cost of capital will have an inverse effect on the desired 
level of capital stock. The result is an adjustment in 
investment spending to reach the new desired level of 
capital stock.
Abel (1982) analyzed the dynamic effects of various 
tax policies in a q-model of investment based on Tobin*s 
(1969) definition of q as the ratio of the market value of 
existing capital to the replacement cost of capital. Abel 
integrates the tax policy analysis of Hall and Jorgenson 
(1967, 1971) with the adjustment cost literature to
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examine the dynamic effects of changes in tax policies in 
an optimizing framework.
Abel's model defines the value of the firm as the 
present value of after-tax cash flows from operating
profit and tax savings from depreciation less after tax
costs of new investments. The theoretical analysis 
indicates that tax policy shifts that change the after-tax 
cost of replacement capital also change the value of g. 
Consequently, the firm will adjust its level of
investments to maximize after-tax cash flows. The 
results of Abel1s analysis indicate that the value of the 
firm increases in response to an unanticipated increase in 
the rate of depreciation or investment tax credits or to 
a decrease in the business income tax rate.
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983) examined the effect of 
changes in the tax laws which lack parity between the
treatment of newly-acquired capital and existing capital. 
Their analysis does not focus on the effects that 
investment incentives have on stock market prices, but 
their conclusions suggest that the market value of the 
firm is reduced as a result of such tax incentives. They 
contend that when investment incentives are implemented 
which apply only to new capital, the value of existing 
assets declines.
The Auerbach and Kotlikoff analysis is based on a 
two-period life cycle computer simulation model which
describes the perfect foresight growth path of life cycle 
economies under various fiscal policies. The simulation 
model calculates the equilibrium growth path of an economy 
consisting of government, household, and production 
sectors. Taxes on capital, consumption, and wages are 
considered in the model. Also included are levels of 
government consumption and choices of government deficit 
policies. The results of the simulation analysis indicate 
that investments incentives can be associated with the 
simultaneous decline in stock market values. Because the 
cost of new capital is lower than the value of existing 
capital, the return on existing capital must fall to 
compete with the newly-acquired capital.
In a subsequent work, Auerbach and Hines (1987) 
developed a framework for analyzing short-run effects of 
changes in tax policy. Using a discrete time model with 
one-year intervals, they predict the economic impact of 
tax proposals which would reduce or eliminate investment 
incentives.
The Auerbach-Hines model assumes two types of fixed 
investments, i.e. structures and equipment, and that there 
are costs associated with adjusting the capital stock when 
tax policy changes. The firm is assumed to choose that 
level of equipment, structures, and labor that maximizes 
the discounted value of its real after-tax cash flows. 
The model ignores changes in relative prices between
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capital goods and output and between different types of 
capital.
Three types of parameters appear in the model: 
production parameters, financial markets parameters, and 
tax parameters. Production parameters relate to (1) gross 
shares of equipment and structures, (2) adjustment costs 
for new levels of capital, and (3) the rate of physical 
capital depreciation. Financial markets parameters relate 
to (1) rate of inflation, and (2) real after-tax required 
rate of return. Tax parameters relate to (1) the 
business tax rate, (2) investment tax credit rate, (3) the 
depreciation allowance for each of the two types of fixed 
investments.
The simulation model produces time series for 
investment in equipment and structures, effective tax 
rates, and market valuations of firms. The simulations 
begin with the assumption that in the beginning the 
economy is in a steady state. The researchers make 
assumptions as to firms' expectations about future changes 
in the values of the variables in the model, then solve 
the model over a period of many years to obtain a 
convergence to a new steady state. The results of the 
simulations indicate that when tax laws remove investment 
incentives, aggregate fixed investment falls and existing 
capital earns windfall profits. The windfall profits 
occur because the cost of new investment is greater than
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the value of existing capital. According to the Auerbach- 
Hines analysis, the higher return required on new capital 
results in an increased return on existing capital. 
Market values of the firm's securities therefore will 
increase to reflect the greater rate of return earned by 
the old capital.
Hendershott (1985) conducted a simulation analysis 
to examine the impact of proposed tax reform packages on 
financial markets. Four proposals were examined, each of 
which had as its purpose improving economic efficiency by 
taxing different capital assets and sources of income more 
equally. Hendershott maintains that equities are claims 
on net cash flows generated for shareholders by capital. 
The market value of such equities should be the risk- 
adjusted present value of the cash flows accruing from the 
capital. The analysis was limited to projecting the impact 
of tax reform on the value of cash flows from the 
existing stock of capital only. Hendershott concluded 
that changes in corporate tax laws which reduce the 
taxation of existing capital increase stock prices by 
increasing after-tax cash flows and lowering the discount 
rate.
After the passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Downs 
and Hendershott (1987) estimated the windfall gains and 
losses accruing to owners of capital securities resulting 
from TRA '86. They obtain results contrary to those of the
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1985 Hendershott study. Using a cash flow model and 
simulation techniques, they analyzed the impact of the tax 
law changes on the value of the firm and its security 
prices. As in the prior work by Hendershott, the value of 
a firm's equity is defined as the discounted sum of 
expected after-tax net cash flows produced from the firm's 
capital.
In the model, net operating income and tax 
depreciation are expectations about all future periods and 
are attributable both to assets currently held and to 
future capital investments. Downs and Hendershott assume 
that each dollar of capital investment provides net 
operating income equal to the marginal product of capital. 
The replacement cost of capital is a function of the 
expected inflation rate, the economic rate of 
depreciation, the effective rate of investment tax credit, 
and the present value of tax depreciation. Future tax 
deductions accruing from existing capital were determined 
based on tax laws in effect when the assets were placed 
into service, and those deductions accruing from future 
investments were determined based on the tax laws after 
the enactment of TRA '86.
The results of the simulation indicate that TRA '86 
should cause an overall increase in stock prices by 10 to 
13 percent. The decrease in marginal tax rates accounts 
for only one quarter of the increase in stock prices; the
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remaining projected increase is due to the repeal of the 
regular investment tax credit and to lengthened cost 
recovery periods for structures. Downs and Hendershott 
contend that the repeal of the investment tax credit and 
the lengthened depreciation for new capital forces the net 
operating income from existing capital upward.
The authors note that a decline in interest rates 
may occur because of reduced investment demands. On the 
one hand, this lower rate affects the value of the firm by 
lowering the discount rate used in computing the present 
value of future cash flows thereby increasing the firm's 
fundamental value and the price of its equity shares. On 
the other hand, lower interest rates reduce the marginal 
cost of capital, and thus net operating income. The 
effect is a lower firm value and reduced stock prices. 
The results indicate that these two effects offset each 
other.
The explanation given for the increase in stock 
prices after the removal of investment incentives from the 
tax laws and lowered corporate tax rates is similar to 
that presented in the F-A-K theory. Since changes in 
depreciation (and ITC) rules do not affect existing 
capital, newly-acquired capital must earn a higher rate of 
return to compete with existing capital. Downs and 
Hendershott explain, "The stock market largely values 
expected returns on the existing capital stock, and these
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returns benefit from the adverse treatment of new 
investment."
Empirical Studies
Sanger (1986) examined the effect of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-455) on the risk and return of REITs. 
The 1976 Act relaxed some provisions relating to REITs so 
that the requirements would be more workable. Conversely, 
certain requirements and limitations were made more 
restrictive. Using share price data as an indicator, 
Sanger attempted to determine whether the beneficial 
provisions outweigh the additional restrictions. He 
suggested that an increase in share prices of publicly- 
traded REITs induced by the passage of the 1976 Act would 
indicate that the beneficial provisions were dominant.
Sanger used monthly average returns of an equally- 
weighted portfolio of individual REITs over a time period 
surrounding the passage of the 1976 Act, including all 
pertinent information dates identified. The regression 
technique employed to determine the market's reaction to 
news concerning passage of the 1976 Act was intervention 
analysis. An information dummy variable was included in 
the market model to represent each month in which 
information concerning the 1976 Act was made public, and a 
shift dummy variable to indicate the shift in the 
regression regime. He used a switching regression 
technique to determine which information date was most
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likely to cause a shift in the model parameters. The 
effects of announcements and the significance of changes 
in the model parameters were measured by t-tests of the 
model's coefficients.
The coefficients for two information dates were 
statistically significant, the first at the 1 percent 
level and the second at the 5 percent level. In both 
incidents, the market reacted favorably to announcements 
concerning changes in the tax laws relative to REITs. 
Sanger concluded that the market assessed the changes in 
the tax laws to be favorable to REITs and adjusted share 
prices accordingly.
Lyon (1986) conducted three studies in which he 
investigated empirically the effects of tax law changes on 
equity values and capital market returns. The first of 
these studies deals with the tax treatment of percentage 
depletion for the oil and gas industry. The second one 
concerns investment tax credits (ITC), and the third issue 
of interest is depreciation rules. Each of these studies 
will be reviewed separately.
The effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (PL 91- 
172) on share prices of oil firms was the focus of Lyon's 
investigation into the relationship between percentage 
depletion and the capital market. The 1969 Act decreased
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the rate of percentage depletion from 27.5 percent to 22 
percent of gross income.5
Lyon presented econometric estimates of the change 
in firm value using two distinct methods, one which 
calculated the expected change in the value of oil 
producing properties, and the other which calculated the 
expected change in the value of after-tax earnings. He 
maintains that either may be suggestive of how the market 
may have interpreted the effects of the changes in the 
tax laws. Lyon's estimates predicted a decline in firm 
value for each of the firms in his sample.
Lyon's sample consisted of 51 publicly-traded firms 
incorporated in the U.S. and engaged in the business of 
extracting and/or refining petroleum. From news indices 
of The Wall Street Journal. The New York Times. and 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, he identified eight 
separate dates of major announcements related to the 1969 
Act and percentage depletion.
To investigate empirically the impact of the 1969 
Act on stock prices of oil firms, Lyon modified the market 
model to include dummy variables representing information 
dates and used intervention analysis techniques. Since 
the firms in the sample were all in the same industry and 
therefore may not have been independent, Lyon controlled
5The Tax Reform Act of 1975 subsequently eliminated 
percentage depletion for major oil producers.
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for contemporaneous cross-correlation by the use of 
Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression model.
Two hypotheses about the event days were tested. 
The first null hypothesis was that the sum of the abnormal 
returns across all firms for any one information date is 
equal to zero. The test of this hypothesis is equivalent 
to a test on the mean of the returns. The means of the 
abnormal returns on five of the information dates were 
less than zero. However, using a two-tailed test, Lyon 
found that the negative mean abnormal returns for only one 
information date was significant at the 10 percent level. 
The significant event was the announcement that votes on 
the Senate floor defeated both the amendment to retain 
percentage depletion and an amendment to reduce depletion. 
Two of the three positive mean abnormal return 
coefficients were significant at the 10 percent 
probability level. The significant dates represented, 
respectively, House hearings and the Senate Committee vote 
to change depletion to 23 percent.
The second null hypothesis was that the sum of the 
abnormal returns across all firms summed over all 
information dates is equal to zero. This hypothesis was 
not rejected. The initial results ~ did not provide 
significant evidence that, overall, the market reacted to 
announcements about depletion legislation.
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Lyon considered the possibility that the information 
date periods were misspecified. He suggested that a one- 
day reaction period following each information date may 
not be sufficient for detecting abnormal returns and 
respecified two of the event dates. The null hypothesis 
was thereafter rejected at the 6 percent probability 
level, indicating that the market did react unfavorably to 
information about depletion legislation.
In the second reported study, Lyon examined the 
effect of changes in the investment tax credit (ITC) on 
the value of the firm and on short-run market returns. He 
described the ITC as a government subsidy which reduced 
the net cost of acquiring new assets and increased after­
tax profits to businesses purchasing qualifying assets.
The five-year timeframe for the study included two 
suspensions of the ITC and two impositions of the credit. 
The observation period began five months prior to the 
first Presidential request to suspend the credit and ended 
five month after the final request to reinstate the 
credit. A sample of 711 firms representing 3 0 different 
industries was drawn from U.S. firms listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange.
Lyon used three different estimation procedures to 
analyze the reaction of the market to announcements 
regarding the investment tax credit. The first was a two- 
step regression procedure in which he tested (1) whether
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the security price of each firm in the sample was affected 
by the Presidential requests for the suspension or 
reinstatement of the ITC, and (2) whether the firms were 
cross-sectionally affected by the ITC changes.
Lyon found that the market did react to 
announcements concerning the suspension and reinstatement 
of the investment tax credit. Moreover, share prices of 
firms which were predicted to benefit to a greater extent 
from investment tax credits responded more favorably to 
reinstatements of the ITC and more adversely to its 
suspension than did firms not predicted to make 
considerable future investments in qualifying property.
The second estimation procedure was the seemingly 
unrelated regression technique. Because of the high 
degree of collinearity among some firms in the sample, 
Lyon divided the firms into four portfolios based on a 
normalized measure of the firms' predicted benefits from 
the investment tax credit. He then used seemingly 
unrelated regression to control for heteroscedasticity and 
contemporaneous cross-correlation. The statistical 
results under this procedure also supported the theory 
that stock prices for the portfolio of firms with the 
highest expected benefit from ITC would be more positively 
influenced by reinstatements of ITC and more negatively 
influenced by suspensions than would the prices of other 
portfolios.
The third estimation procedure was the restricted 
seemingly unrelated regression technique. Lyon was 
interested in whether the existence of a linear 
relationship could be established between changes in firm 
value and calculated expected direct benefits of ITC. He 
formed ten portfolios based on the decile ranking of the 
firm for ITC benefits and applied a restricted seemingly 
unrelated regression technique to determine if the 
relationship between the abnormal portfolio returns and 
estimated tax benefits from ITC was constant across all 
portfolios. The restriction that the coefficients of
interest were equal across portfolios could not be 
rejected, indicating that a linear relationship may exist.
The third change in tax laws of interest in the Lyon 
studies is the enactment of the Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (ACRS) provisions in the Economic Recovery Tax Act 
of 1981 (ERTA). Lyon examined empirically the effect of 
ERTA on the value of the firm.
The effect of the ACRS provisions on the net cost of 
32 types of equipment and structures was calculated. 
Proxies for the expected change in firm value were 
developed by using the data on the ownership of the 32 
types of equipment and structures by narrow industry 
groups and incorporating the data with firm-specific 
information. The change in the value of the firm was
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calculated as a weighted average of savings to the firm 
from each of its different capital assets multiplied by 
its total investment.
Lyon used the capital asset pricing model for 
estimating the return for each firm. The risk-free rate 
of return was replaced by the monthly return on a 90-day 
Treasury bill, and a different beta was estimated for each 
firm from the time series regression. To test whether an 
individual security is affected by information regarding 
the Congressional approval of ERTA, a dummy variable was 
introduced into the model which takes on a value of one in 
July and August 1981, the months of Congressional action, 
and a value of zero in all other estimation periods. The 
regression regime was estimated for a 70 month period 
beginning 40 months prior to Congressional action on ERTA 
and extending 28 months beyond the period of action. The 
dummy variable coefficient provides a measure of the 
abnormal return to the individual security during the two 
months of Congressional action. From this point forward, 
the methodology employed by Lyon to examine the effect of 
ERTA on firm value and stock prices is almost identical to 
that used in the previous study concerning ITC. 
Therefore, the methodological details are omitted in this 
review.
The results of the first statistical procedure, the 
two-step regression estimates, failed to reject the null
hypothesis that the coefficients were significantly 
different from zero during the two months of Congressional 
action on ERTA. Tests of seemingly unrelated regression 
estimates on quartile portfolios also failed to reject the 
null hypothesis of equality between any pair of 
portfolios. No significant relationship was found to
exist between actual changes in firm value and predicted 
changes in value. Test results of restricted seemingly 
unrelated regression estimates on decile portfolios were 
consistent with those of the other two procedures. No 
significant relationship was detected between predicted 
changes in firm values and the estimated abnormal return 
to the common stock of the sample firms during the 
Congressional action period.
Several possible reasons are suggested by Lyon for 
failure to obtain significant results. First, the period 
in question marked the beginning of the eighth post-war 
recession in the U.S. Any increase in returns caused by 
ACRS announcements may have been offset by recessionary 
declines. The use of the market returns in the modified 
capital asset pricing model partially controlled for the 
effect of the recession, but Lyon suggests the use of a 
multiple factor model of firm returns to control fully for 
regression effects.
A second possible intervening factor is the 
provisions of ERTA which reduced personal income taxes.
4 8
The beneficial effects of personal tax cuts on consumer 
industries may have obscured the effects of changes in 
business taxes. The revenue reduction also may have 
increased the real after-tax interest rate and, 
consequently, the rate at which future cash flows are 
discounted.
A third problem relates to the limited time period 
for which abnormal returns were tested. If the changes in 
the tax laws were anticipated prior to the two months in 
question, the model would fail to capture the effects of 
information about changes in the tax laws.
Summary and Analysis
A number of researchers have been concerned with 
determining the impact of various types of tax legislation 
on the capital markets. To this end, both static and 
dynamic econometric models have been developed in order to 
assess the relationship between tax policy changes and 
market responses. Moreover, some researchers focus on the 
short-run while others place greater importance on long- 
run equilibrium. Consequently, the results of the 
analyses have not been consistent. Some conclude that a 
positive relationship exists between tax incentives and 
firm value; others determine the relationship to be an 
inverse one.
Summers (1981) notes that both conclusions may be 
correct. In the short-run, new investments may return
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windfall profits or losses to their owners. In the long- 
run, however, newly-acquired assets and pre-existing 
assets must compete against each other, and the resultant 
effect on firm value may be in the opposite direction 
than in the short run. Summers concludes that the net 
effect on the value of the firm depends on the relative 
magnitude of the two opposing forces.
Studies which use observed values for examining the 
relationship between changes in tax policy and firm values 
tend to support the theory that a direct relationship 
exists between investment incentives in the tax laws and 
changes in stock prices. Sanger found that when some of 
the restrictions placed on REITs were relaxed, the share 
price of REITs increased. Lyon’s investigation into the 
effect of reductions in the percentage depletion allowance 
on the value of oil firms provided additional support for 
the theory of a positive relationship.
Upon examining the effect of the investment tax 
credit (ITC) on firm value, Lyon found that each time ITC 
was eliminated, share prices dropped for those firms which 
invest heavily in equipment and machinery. With each 
reinstatement of ITC, the share prices of those firms 
increased. However, Lyons' analysis of the effect of 
changes in depreciation laws on firm value provided only 
weak support for the theory of a direct relationship 
between tax incentives and firm prices. The changes were
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TRA *86 contains a number of provisions regarding 
the taxation of earnings from real estate related 
activities. This chapter reviews the legislative history 
of those tax law changes that are germane to this study. 
The legislative history is presented in two sections. The 
first section reviews the provisions relating to the 
depreciation of real property; the second section 
discusses the changes in corporate tax rates. In each 
section, the tax provisions as they stood before the 
enactment of TRA '86 are first presented, followed by a 
discussion of proposed bills and Congressional action in 
the chronological order of their occurrences. Next, the 
enacted versions of the provisions are described. This is 
followed by a review of subsequent legislative action 
relative to cost recovery of real property and to 
corporate tax rates. Finally, a short summary of the 
relevant changes is provided.
Cost Recovery of Real Property
Prior Law. The method of depreciation used for 
recovering the cost of real assets depends on the
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depreciation provisions in effect at the time the asset 
was placed into service. Consequently, assets placed into 
service prior to the effective date of TRA '86 may be 
depreciated under a number of different methods.
Since the inception of the Federal income tax in 
19 09, taxpayers have been allowed a deduction for 
depreciation of certain types of assets. Prior to 1954, 
taxpayers generally were permitted to use only the 
straight line method for recovering the cost of 
depreciable assets. However, the determination of the 
appropriate depreciable life and estimated salvage value 
was, with some limitations, left to the discretion of the 
taxpayer. In 1954, Congress began permitting the use of 
accelerated methods of depreciation, but inconsistencies 
still existed in the determination of useful lives of 
assets (Mertens Law of Fed Income Tax, sec. 23A.03).
The Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system was 
established by Revenue Procedure 62-21, and was made a 
part of the tax law in the Revenue Act of 1971 (P.L. 92- 
178) . The ADR system assigns a life range to broad 
classes of assets. Real property was assigned class lives 
of 40 to 60 years, depending on the purpose of the 
building's use. The ADR system afforded taxpayers 
considerable flexibility, however, in choosing a 
depreciable life, and accelerated depreciation methods 
permitted taxpayers to recover the cost of real property
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at a much faster rate than would have occurred with the 
straight line depreciation method (sec.167). 
Consequently, depreciable real assets placed into service 
subsequent to 1970 but prior to 1981 may be depreciated 
using any number of methods over a period of 32 to 72 
years. Permissible cost recovery methods for real 
property include (1) the straight line method, (2) the 
declining balance method up to 200% depending on the 
classification of the property, (3) the sum of the years 
digits method, and (4) any other consistent method whereby 
the amount of write-off during the first two-thirds of the 
asset's depreciable life does not exceed the amount that 
would have been written off using the declining balance 
method and the applicable percentage rate (sec. 168).
The Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) (sec. 
168) was established with the enactment of the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Real property was assigned a 
statutory recovery period and depreciated using the 175% 
declining balance method (200% for low income housing), 
changing to the straight line method to maximize 
acceleration. For real property placed into service under 
ACRS rules but prior to March 16, 1984, the recovery
period is 15 years. The cost of real property placed into 
service subsequent to March 15, 1984, but prior to May 9, 
1985, is recovered over 18 years; property placed into 
services between May 8, 1985 and January 1, 1987 is
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depreciated over 19 years. These changes in recovery 
periods for real property did not apply to real property 
classified as low-income housing.
The amount of depreciation allowable on 15-year real 
property in the years of acquisition and disposition was 
prorated based on the month in which the asset was placed 
into service or disposed of using a full-month convention. 
For 18 and 19 year property, a mid-month convention 
applies.
Bradlev-Gephardt. The Bradley-Gephardt bill 
proposed a Simplified Cost Recovery System (SCRS) (U.S. 
Cong., House (hearings), 1985, 97-133). Under the
provisions of SCRS, the cost of depreciable real property 
would be recovered over a period of 40 years. The amount 
of write-off for each year would be based on 250 percent 
declining balance depreciation applied to the adjusted 
basis of the asset. A mid-month convention applied to 
real property placed into service during the year. No 
provision was included for inflation adjustment.
Kemp-Kasten. The Kemp-Kasten bill for the "Fair and 
Simple Tax Act of 1984" originally contained no provision 
for changes to the ACRS rules (U.S. Cong. Senate 1985, 
S2600). However, a subsequent revision to the bill 
proposed a Neutral Cost Recovery System (NCRS) (U.S. 
Cong., House (hearings) 1985, 138-179). Under the
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provisions of NCRS, the cost of depreciable real property 
would be recovered over a period of 25 years at a 
statutory straight line rate of six percent per year. In 
the year in which the asset was placed into service, the 
rate of depreciation would be four percent. No 
depreciation would be allowed in the year of disposal.
The invariant statutory depreciation rate would be 
applied to the inflation-adjusted basis of the asset 
rather than to the original cost basis. Moreover, in 
order to provide that the present value of the aggregate 
depreciation deductions is equal to the value of immediate 
expensing, the total amount of nominal dollars of 
depreciation on real property under NCRS would be greater 
than the inflation-adjusted original cost of the asset.
Treasury I . In its 1984 proposal for Tax Reform, 
the Treasury recommended the establishment of capital cost 
recovery rules whereby inflation would be explicitly 
factored into the depreciation system and "the real 
economic loss inherent in the use of assets over time" 
would be accounted for. A new Real Cost Recovery System 
(RCRS) was proposed that embodied three major changes to 
ACRS. These changes related to depreciable life, 
percentage rate of depreciation, and basis adjustment for 
inflation.
First, depreciable real assets (except utility 
property) would be reassigned a depreciable life of 63
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years. Second, the allowance for depreciation each
period would be adjusted for inflation by means of a basis 
adjustment. The inflation factor would be accounted for 
by increasing the unrecovered asset basis each year by the 
rate of inflation. Third, an invariant depreciation rate 
of three percent would be applied to the inflation-
adjusted declining balance of the asset. No inflation 
adjustment would be allowed in the asset's first year, and 
a mid-month convention would apply in the years of 
acquisition and disposition.
The Treasury reported that ACRS results in failure 
to adequately measure inflation-adjusted income thereby
over-taxing or under-taxing real economic income. It 
further stated that ACRS distorts investment decisions and 
hampers economic efficiency by favoring certain classes of 
businesses or industries over others. Moreover, the tax 
berrefits of ACRS have given rise to tax shelters which 
have no economic justification. The Treasury Department's 
report also cited complexity in the tax laws and
uncertainty regarding fluctuating inflation rates as 
reasons for replacing ACRS with the RCRS.
President's Proposal. Like the 1984 Treasury
proposal, the President's proposal (1985) also recommended 
the establishment of a depreciation system whereby 
inflation would be explicitly taken into account. A new 
Capital Cost Recovery System (CCRS) was proposed that
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suggested three major changes to ACRS. These changes 
related to depreciable life, percentage rate of 
depreciation, and basis adjustment for inflation.
First, depreciable real assets (except utility 
property) would be reassigned a recovery period of 28 
years. Second, the allowance for depreciation each
period would be adjusted for inflation by means of a basis 
adjustment. The inflation factor would be accounted for 
by increasing the unrecovered asset basis each year by the 
rate of inflation. Third, an invariant depreciation rate 
of four percent would be applied to the inflation adjusted 
~ ' declining balance of the asset. However, the declining 
balance rate would switch to a straight line rate in the 
year in which the straight line rate yields a higher 
depreciation allowance than the declining balance rate. 
No inflation adjustment would be allowed in the asset's 
first year, and a pro-rata adjustment would apply in the 
year of disposition. A mid-month convention would apply 
in the years of acquisition and disposition.
The reasons cited for recommended changes in the 
cost recovery system were much like those mentioned in the 
Treasury I report. The President's Proposal mentioned 
problems with ACRS such as disregard of economic 
depreciation, n o n - n e u t r a l i t y  of ACRS investment 
incentives, proliferation of tax shelters, and complexity 
in the tax law.
House Version of TRA *86. The House bill provided 
for the replacement of ACRS with the Incentive 
Depreciation System (IDS) (U.S. Cong., House (hearings) 
1985, 97-133). Under IDS, assets would be grouped into
ten classes, based generally on ADR midpoint lives. Real 
property, except low income housing6, generally would be 
assigned to IDS Class 10 and depreciated using the 
straight line method over a period of 30 years. Allowable 
depreciation in the years of acquisition and disposition 
would be prorated based on the number of months the asset 
was held. Acquisition and disposition made during the 
month would be treated as if they occurred at mid-month.
For assets placed into service after the enactment 
of the bill and depreciated under the provisions of IDS, 
IDS deductions would be adjusted for inflation, beginning 
in 1988. The inflation adjustment would be one-half the 
rate of inflation in excess of five percent. However, no 
adjustment would be allowed in the years of acquisition or 
disposition.
Senate Version of TRA *86. The Senate version of 
the Tax Reform bill (1985) retained the ACRS with some 
modifications, and no provision was made for taking 
inflation into account in computing depreciation
6Low-income housing would be assigned to IDS Class 9 
and the cost recovered using the double declining balance 
method, switching to straight line to maximize deductions, 
over a period of 3 0 years.
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allowances. A major change introduced by the bill relates 
to depreciable real property. The Senate bill 
distinguished between residential and non-residential
property and provided that the cost of all depreciable 
real property be recovered using the straight line 
method.
Under the Senate bill, the cost of residential
rental property would be recovered over a period of 27.5 
years using straight line depreciation. Residential 
property was defined as a structure from which at least 80 
percent of its income is rental income from providing 
living accommodations on a non-transient basis.
The cost of non-residential real property would be 
recovered over a period of 31.5 years, also using 
straight line depreciation. The Bill defined non- 
residential real property as section 1250 class property 
that has class life in excess of 12.5 years and is not 
residential real property. A mid-month convention would 
have applied to both residential and non-residential real 
property at both acquisition and disposition.
Final Version of TRA *86. The final version of TRA
'86 adopted the provisions of the Senate amendment with
regard to the cost recovery of real property (P.L. 99-
514) . Thus, the Act requires that the cost of real 
property be recovered using the straight line method over 
27.5 or 31.5 years, depending on the class of property,
and does not allow for inflation adjustments of 
depreciation deductions.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. Neither 
the House nor the Senate version of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987 contained provisions relating 
to the cost recovery of real property.
Corporate Taxation
Prior Law. Under the provisions of the 1954 
Internal Revenue Code, regular corporations were taxed on 
earnings at a maximum rate of 46 percent on all income in 
excess of $100,000 (IRC 1954, sec. 11). Corporations 
having earnings less than $1,000,000 were taxed according 
to the following schedule:
A phase-out of graduated rates began after taxable 
corporate earnings exceeded $1,000,000, and were totally 
phased out at $1,405,000. Thus, corporations with taxable 
earnings of $1,405,000 or more were subject to taxation at 
a flat rate of 46 percent.
Corporations were further subject to an add-on 
minimum tax on certain tax preference items. Corporations 
generally were liable for a 15 percent minimum tax on tax







$25,000 - $50,000 
$50,000 - $75,000 
$75,000 - $100,000 
over $100,000
preferences in excess of the greater of (a) $10,000 or (b) 
the regular corporate income tax for the tax year (IRC 
1954, sec. 56).
Bradlev-Gephardt. The Bradley-Gephardt tax plan
would tax corporate income at a flat rate of 30 percent 
and would eliminate the corporate minimum tax (U.S. Cong., 
House (hearings), 1985, 97-133).
Kemp-Kasten. Under the original proposal of the 
Kemp-Kasten Fair and Simple Tax Act, the first $50,000 of 
corporate income would be taxed at a rate of 15 percent. 
Income in excess of $50,000 would be taxed at 30 percent. 
Under the revised version of the bill, the maximum rate of 
taxation on corporate income would be 35 percent, and 
corporations would be taxed according to the following 
progressive rate schedule.
The benefits of the lower tax rates would not be 
phased out for high income corporations and the plan would 
retain the corporate minimum tax (U.S. Cong., House 
(hearings), 1985, 138-179).




$50,000 or less 
$50,000 - $100,000 
over $100,000
Treasury I . The Treasury I proposal of Tax Reform 
for Fairness. Simplicity, and Economic Growth (1984)
would impose a flat-rate tax of 33 percent on taxable 
income of corporations. The proposal further would 
broaden the tax base for corporations and repeal the 
corporate minimum tax. The Treasury Report states that 
the progressive rate structure for corporations "serves no 
affirmative purpose" and encourages the use of the 
corporate form of organization to take advantage of lower 
tax brackets. The Treasury Department reported that by 
broadening the corporate tax base and imposing a flat tax 
at a lower rate, corporations would be taxed more 
uniformly.
President's Proposal. Recommendations for two major 
changes to the taxation of corporations are contained in 
The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for 
Fairness. Growth, and Simplicity (1985) : one is lower
tax rates; the other is a dividends-paid deduction. The 
purpose of both provisions is to reduce the burden of 
taxation on corporations and encourage equity investment 
in the corporate sector.
The President's proposal would decrease the top 
marginal tax rate on corporate income to 33 percent and 
reduce the number of tax brackets to four. Corporations 
having income under $75,000 would be taxed according to 
the following schedule:
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$25,000 or less 
$25,000 - $50,000 
$50,001 - $75,000 
over $75,000
A phase-out of the graduated rates would begin at 
$140,000 and the phase-out would be complete on income of 
$360,000. Thus, corporations with income of $360,000 or 
more would pay a flat tax rate of 33 percent.
The plan predicted that the lower tax rates for 
corporations generally would reduce the after-tax cost of 
corporate equity capital, thereby making equity securities 
more comparative with debt. Corporations would thus be 
less encouraged to raise capital by issuing debt and 
would, instead, increase corporate equity investment.
The President's proposal would have replaced the 
then add-on minimum tax for corporations with an 
alternative minimum tax. The alternative minimum tax rate 
of 20 percent would apply to taxable income plus the 
excess of preference items over $10,000, and would be 
offset by foreign tax credits. The term "tax preference 
item" was redefined under the proposal to take into 
account additional preferences. An exemption of $15,000 
would apply.
House Version of TRA *86. Under the House bill
(1985) , the following three-bracket graduated rate 
structure would apply to corporate income.
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Tax Rate Taxable Income
15 percent $50,000 or less
25 percent $50,001 - $75,000
36 percent over $75,000
A phase-out of the benefit of graduated rates would
occur on income between $100,000 and $365,000. An 
additional five-percent tax on such income would have the 
effect of requiring corporations having taxable income of 
$3 65,000 or more to pay tax at a flat rate of 36 percent.
Senate Version of TRA '86. The Senate bill (1986) 
for TRA *86 would impose a maximum tax rate of 33 percent 
on corporate income under a graduated rate schedule and 
would also reduce the number of brackets from five to 
three. The purpose of the provision was to promote 
economic growth by lowering tax rates and thereby 
increasing the return on investments. The Senate Finance 
Committee felt that lower tax rates also would improve 
resource allocation and promote tax compliance. Moreover, 
a graduated structure was retained to encourage growth in 
small businesses. Income up to $100,000 would be taxed 
according to the following schedule.
Tax Rate Taxable Income
15 percent $50,000 and less
25 percent $50,001 - $75,000
33 percent over $75,000
Corporate income in excess of $100,000 would have 
levied upon it an additional five percent tax up to an
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additional tax of $11,000. The benefit of graduated rates 
would be phased out by the additional five percent tax for 
corporations with income between $100,000 and $320,000. 
Thus, corporations with income in excess of 320,000 would 
pay a flat tax at a rate of 33 percent.
The Senate version of tax reform would replace the 
corporation add-on minimum tax with an alternative minimum 
tax and would more broadly define "tax preference items." 
Under the Senate provisions, corporations would pay a tax 
of at least 20 percent of an amount approximating economic 
income. A $40,000 exemption would be allowed on tax 
preference items, but this exemption would be phased out 
on income between $150,000 and $310,000.
Final Version of TRA '86. The final version of The 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 provides for a three-bracket 
graduated tax on corporate income with an additional tax 
imposed on income in excess of $100,000. The tax rate 
schedule imposed by TRA '86 is as follows:
Corporate income in excess of $100,000 now has 
levied upon it an additional 5 percent tax up to an 
additional tax of $11,750. Thus, corporations with income 
in excess of $335,000 must pay a flat rate of 34 percent.




$50,000 and less 
$50,001 - $75,000 
over $75,000
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Like the Senate version of tax reform, the final bill 
replaces the corporation add-on minimum tax with an 
alternative minimum tax and more broadly defines "tax 
preference items."
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. The 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 does not provide 
for a change in tax rates for corporations, other than for 
certain personal service corporations. However, the House 
version of the bill (1987) would have raised the 
alternative minimum tax base. The House bill provided 
that 100 percent of the excess of book and adjusted 
current earnings over other alternative minimum taxable 
income would be a tax preference item for corporations. 
For many corporations, the alternative minimum tax 
provision generally would result in a tax liability of a 
greater percentage of book income.
The Senate version of the bill (1987) provided for 
no change to the alternative minimum tax provisions of 
TRA '86, and the Joint Conference followed the Senate 
a m e n d m e n t .  Consequently, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987 does not alter the alternative 
minimum tax base.
Summary
From the time of the introduction of the Bradley- 
Gephardt tax plan until the enactment of TRA '86, the
proposed corporate taxation and real property cost 
recovery provisions experienced considerable evolutionary 
change. Real property now is subject to longer recovery 
periods, and the use of accelerated depreciation methods 
for newly-acquired real property is no longer permitted. 
For corporate taxation, the result is a reduction in the 
tax rate and a broader income tax base. The focus of this 
study is on the reaction of the real estate capital 
markets to the evolutionary Congressional procedure and to 
the final legislative results.
CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study investigates the impact of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 (TRA ’86) on the real estate capital markets. 
More specifically, it is intended to determine if the Act 
results in a differential effect on firm values across 
entity and functional forms of real estate activities with 
regard to depreciation and corporate tax rates.
This chapter presents the methodology used to answer 
the above question. The first section discusses the time 
frame of the study and the data. Second, the sample 
selection techniques and criteria are described. Third, 
the development of the statistical model is presented, and 
fourth, the statistical methods to be used in the research 
are explained. Finally, the hypotheses are listed along 
with a discussion of portfolio composition, followed by a 
brief summary of the issues outlined in this chapter.
Time Period and Data
The test periods for this study are the months when 
significant new information regarding TRA '86 was publicly 
announced. In order to identify those months in which 
information became publicly available, a search of The
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Wall Street Journal was conducted for announcements 
concerning the Act. Announcements regarding TRA ’86 
appeared during at least 13 separate months. These months 
are specified as information months and are shown in Table 
4.1.
Monthly data over the period from January 1, 1981
through December 31, 1987 was used to establish the 
relationship between over-all market returns and returns 
in the real estate market. January 1, 1981 was selected 
as the beginning of the data time period because it
represents the beginning of a reasonably stable period of 
time relative to tax legislation affecting real estate. 
Under ERTA, the cost of property placed into service after 
1980 generally could be "recovered" under an accelerated 
form of depreciation. Although the recovery period for 
real property was lengthened from 15 to 18 years by the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (PL 98-369) and further
lengthened to 19 years in 1985 (PL 99-121), there was no
change in recovery method. Any reaction by the market to
these changes in recovery periods was expected to be very 
small and not to have a significant effect on the results 
of this study. Tests of significance were conducted for 
those months in which a change in recovery period may have 
caused market reactions. The results confirmed that the 
change in recovery period did not affect significantly the 
real estate capital markets.
TABLE 4.1
Dates and Descriptions of Announcements Concerning 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986*
Event









The Bradley-Gephardt tax overhaul plan is 
introduced.
The Kemp-Kasten tax reform bill is 
introduced.
Treasury I is presented by Treasury Secretary 
Donald Regan.
The President's Tax Reform Plan is introduced 
by the Treasury Department.
Tax overhaul bill is passed by House Ways and 
Means Committee.**
Ways and Means bill is passed by the full 
House.
Senate version of tax reform bill is passed 
by Senate Finance Committee.












October 198 6 
October 1987 
December 1987
Compromise tax bill is approved by House 
and Senate Conference Committee.
Conference Committee Bill is passed by full 
House and Senate.
Tax Reform Act of 1986 is signed into law 
by President Reagan.
House passes its version of Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 
is passed by Senate and Conference 
Committee.
"Source; The Wall Street Journal
** Although the bill was reported to the House on December 3, 1985, 
virtually all of the provisions had been voted on and agreed to 
by the Committee by the end of November. Consequently, for the purpose 
of this research, November is treated as the information period.
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Sample Selection
The sample of firms used in this study was chosen
from the population of publicly-traded firms engaged in
real estate activities. The sample includes regular
corporations, real estate investment trusts (REITs), and 
master limited partnerships (MLPs) identified from a 
listing published by Realty Stocks Review.
The requirements that entities had to meet to be 
included in the sample are repeated here.
1. The firm must be listed on the American or New 
York stock exchange.
2. The firm must have data available in the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
daily stock return files.
3. The firm must have at least 12 consecutive 
monthly returns during the sample period.
4. The firm must have tax status continuity 
during its 12-month period of consecutive 
returns.
The first and second requirements relate to data 
availability. The purpose of the third requirement is to 
prevent the inclusion of short-lived firms whose reaction 
to information events may be atypical. The tax continuity 
requirement prevents possible contamination of the results 
by effects of changes in tax status on the market value of 
firm equity. The tax status of the sample entities was 
verified for each year of inclusion through Moody's.
To facilitate grouping the firms into portfolios for 
statistical analysis, each firm in the sample was 
identified according to the entity form under which it 
operates. These entity forms include regular corporations 
and non-corporations (i.e., REITs and MLPs). Each firm 
further was classified as to the functional form of real 
estate activities in which it engages. These include 
equity investors, mortgage investors, hybrid investors7 , 
and builders/developers. Realty Stock Review 
classifications and SIC codes were used to identify the 
primary functional activity of each firm. Firms that 
c o u l d  not be c l a s s i f i e d  c l e a r l y  because of 
diversification or lack of information availability were 
eliminated from the sample.
Statistical Techniques and Hypotheses
The Model. The capital asset pricing model (Sharpe 
1964 and Lintner 1965) holds that capital assets will be 
priced by the market such that
(4.1) E(ri) = rf + 0i[E(rm ) - rf]
where:
r^ = the return to security i 
rf = the risk-free rate of return
7 Hybrid investors are firms which hold both real 
property for the production of income and mortgages backed 
by real property.
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rm = the market return
= cov(r^,rm )/var(rm ), described as systematic 
risk
E is the expectation operator.
The expected return of security i includes expectations by 
the market about both dividends and capital gains. The 
model assumes that when the market is in equilibrium, the 
risk-adjusted rate of return is equal for all securities. 
Therefore, absent a change in the stochastic return 
process, the returns to security i at time t can be 
modeled as
(4.2) r^t = ai + 0irmt + e-ĵ
where:
rit = *-he stochastic return on security i at time t 
measured as the change in price plus any 
dividends paid at time t, divided by the price 
at time t-1
a-L = the regression intercept of security i
= the systematic risk of security i
r^t = the weighted average market return at time t
e^t = the stochastic error term for security i at 
time t.
In the event of some intervention in the return- 
generating process, abnormal returns may result for 
certain securities. The method used in this study for 
examining the effect of interventions on the real estate 
capital markets is the addition of dummy variables to the
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market model and the use of seemingly unrelated 
regression.
Following methodology suggested by Schwert (1981) 
and Larcker, Gordon, and Pinches (198 0), and subsequently 
used by Chen and Sanger (1984), Binder (1985), Lyon
(1986) , and Sanger (1986, 1987) , this study employs the
technique of intervention analysis to examine the real 
estate markets' reaction to information leading to the 
enactment of TRA '86. Intervention analysis is a 
regression technique using dummy variables representing 
"some specified set of interventions that may (permanently 
or temporarily) change the nature or level of the return 
from the time series . . ." (Schwert 1981, p. 272). Its 
use is appropriate when some economic event, such as a 
change in tax laws, is believed to change the level of 
risk for a particular security, or group of securities, or 
to result in abnormal returns. Larcker, Gordon, and 
Pinches (1980) suggest that intervention analysis is 
preferable to cumulative average residual methodology for 
a nalyzing stock market reactions to financial 
announcements because it allows a and (3 to vary in periods 
of abnormal returns.
Two different intervention dummy variables are added 
to the market model for this study. Shift dummy 
variables, Ds , are added to the model to specify a 
permanent change in a and/or j3, and a switching regression
7 6
technique is employed for identifying the point in the 
time series at which such change occurred. The purpose of 
identifying a shift in the regression relation is to avoid 
model misspecification and to obtain a better fit of the 
regression line. For specifying months in which 
announcements concerning TRA '86 may have resulted in 
interventions in the return generating process, an 
information dummy variable, is added to the model.
The coefficient of the information dummy variable captures 
the abnormal returns in those months when information 
about TRA *86 became publicly available to the market.
In the presence of announcements concerning 
impending changes in the tax law that may affect real 
estate^ protfolio returns, the market model corresponding 
to Equation 4.2 may be respecified as




Rpt = the stochastic return on portfolio p in time 
period t
Rmt = the stochastic return on the value weighted
index of NYSE and AMEX stocks in time period t
ctp = the regression constant or intercept of 
portfolio p before the intervention
«p = the shift in the regression intercept of 
portfolio p due to the intervention
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/3p = the systematic risk coefficient of portfolio p
before the intervention
= the shift in the systematic risk coefficient 
of portfolio p due to the intervention
fipk = coefficient of information dummy variable 
for portfolio p
K = number of months in which information
concerning TRA *86 is publicly announced, 
where k ranges over those months, and only 
those months, during which such information is 
publicly announced
ept = the stochastic error term for portfolio p at 
time t.
Switching Regression. When estimating the 
parameters of the market model, a constant value of a and 
f3 over the entire time series generally is assumed. 
However, uncertainty regarding the outcome of proposed tax 
legislation may have resulted in a fundamental change in 
the regression relation of real estate returns to the 
market returns at some point in the time series. 
Consequently, a stationary regression line may not 
describe adequately the relationship between the market 
returns and the returns of the portfolios in this study. 
To estimate Equation 4.3, therefore, it is necessary to
Ds = shift dummy
information dummy
1 in infor 
mation 
month k,
but only if 
t = k 
0 otherwise
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determine whether such a change occurred, and if so, to 
identify the point in the time series of returns at which 
the model parameters shifted.
Since the date of the switch is not known a priori, 
a switching regression technique is used to determine when 
the regression equation switches from one regime to 
another (Quant 1958, 1960). Quant suggests that the shift 
in the regime can be identified through the use of maximum 
likelihood techniques whereby the observations of the time 
series are partitioned into two groups and a separate 
regression equation is estimated for each group. The 
possible switch date representing the dividing point is 
allowed to vary and two new regression equations are 
estimated for each date until the likelihood function for 
the entire period is maximized.
Figure 4.1(a) shows a regression line that is 
estimated using dividing point tj. Figure 4.1(b) shows a 
second regression line that is estimated using dividing 
point t-2 • The partition point that maximizes the 
likelihood function with respect to t indicates the point 
in the time series at which the regression parameters 
switched from one regime to a second regime. Details of 




Comparison of Regression Lines
(a) Regression line when (b) Regression line when
time-frame of returns time-frame of returns
is divided at time t^. is divided at time t2 •
The shift in the regression equation is incorporated 
into the model by the addition of dummy shift variables, 
Ds . The dummy shift variables take on a value of zero 
before the shift and a value of one after the shift. 
Thus, the shift variable coefficients indicate the 
direction and magnitude of the shift in the regression 
relation. The switching regression technique used in this 
study better specifies the relationship between overall 
market returns and returns within the real estate capital 
markets whenever a tax change announcement acts as an
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intervention and a permanent change occurs in the 
relationship.8
Abnormal Returns. An information dummy variable, 
DIkt' included in the model to identify abnormal
returns in those months in which information regarding 
proposed tax law changes was publicly announced. For each 
month, k, in which new information concerning TRA '86 is 
reported in The Wall Street Journal. the dummy variable 
DIkk E<3uat;*-on 4 *3 takes on a value equal to one. In 
all other months, t ^ k, is zero. The dummy
variable coefficient, Spfc, is designed to capture that 
part of the portfolio return that is unique to information 
months and not explained by other terms in the model. 
Thus, fipfc measures the abnormal return on portfolio p in 
month k.
Seemingly Unrelated Regression. The coefficients of 
Equation 4.3 were determined by the use of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression techniques. For the purpose of
8 Researchers who have used switching regression 
techniques in capital market studies include Sanger (1986) 
and Lyon (1986) . Sanger examined the impact of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976 on REITs and determined, by use of 
switching regression, that the regression relationship for 
REIT returns obeyed two separate regression regimes. 
Similar results were found for the oil and gas industry by 
Lyon. The results of these studies suggest that an 
intervention in the time series of the return-generating 
process may cause a shift in the regression coefficients 
should be examined.
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cross-sectional comparisons, however, OLS is not 
appropriate. Ordinary least squares regression assumes 
that the error terms in the regression model are 
uncorrelated. However, since all firms in the sample are 
from the same industry, the error terms may be correlated 
(King 1966). Independent error terms is not, however, an 
assumption of generalized least squares regression.
S e emingly unrelated regression (SUR) is a 
generalized least squares regression technique that 
controls for cross-correlation by allowing for joint 
estimation of all firms (Zelner 1962). For SUR, Equation 
4.3 is disaggregated into a system of equations, and pairs 
of equations are estimated simultaneously. Normally, each 
firm in the sample could be represented by one equation. 
However, since the number of observations in the time 
series must be greater than the number of regression 
coefficients, the SUR technique necessitates grouping the 
firms into portfolios, with each portfolio being 
represented by one equation in the system.
The return of a portfolio is the weighted average of 
the returns of the individual securities comprising the 
portfolio, and can be expressed as:
(4.4) Rp = 2 Xj_rj_, Z Xj_ = 1,
where:
Rp = the rate of return of the portfolio
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Xi = the proportion of the portfolio value 
attributable to security i
r^ — the rate of return on security i.
Theil (1971, pp. 309-310) shows that joint estimates 
of the coefficients in the SUR model yield the same values 
of the coefficients as do the ordinary least squares 
estimates. However, SUR uses the full estimated 
covariance matrix from the joint regression for conducting 
tests of hypotheses concerning the estimated coefficients. 
Thus, this technique corrects for cross-correlation among 
portfolios and improves the efficiency of the estimates.
In order to test the hypotheses and answer the 
research questions, OLS estimates were first obtained for 
individual portfolios, and an overall P test was conducted 
for each portfolio. Tests of significance on the 
coefficients of the information dummy variable were 
conducted using two-tail t tests. OLS is appropriate for 
tests of significance whereby cross-sectional differences 
are not of interest. Next, for conducting tests of cross- 
sectional differences, joint estimates of all the 
coefficients of Equation 4.3 were obtained for pairs of 
portfolios, using SUR techniques. An overall F test was 
conducted on each pair of portfolios. Tests of 
significant differences on the coefficients were conducted 
using Theil's F test (Judge et al. 1985).
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Before estimating the coefficients of the model, the 
assumptions of the regression model were tested. Serial 
correlation was found in the returns of some portfolios 
and variable transformation was necessary for improving 
the estimates of the standard errors.
Hypotheses. In order to determine whether the real 
estate capital markets respond to changes in the tax law 
as predicted by the traditional theory, three specific 
research questions are proposed.
(1) Do the real estate capital markets react to 
publicly available information concerning 
proposed or actual changes in the tax law?
(2) Does a change from accelerated depreciation to 
straight line and longer recovery periods for 
real property result in an overall decrease in 
the market value of firms engaged in holding 
income-producing property relative to those 
engaged in other real estate activities?
(3) Does a decrease in corporate tax rates result 
in an increase in the market value of real 
estate corporations relative to other real 
estate entities, such as REITs and MLPs, that 
generally are not taxed at the entity level?
Three hypotheses are presented for answering the 
research questions. In order to address the first 
specific research question and ascertain whether the real 
estate capital markets react to announcements concerning 
tax law changes, the firms were grouped into 6 portfolios 
as shown in Table 4.2.
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For statistical testing, the following null 
hypothesis is presented:
TABLE 4.2




1. Corporations - Equity Investors
2. Corporations - Mortgage Investors
3 . Corporations - Builders/Developers
4. REITs and MLPs - Equity Investors
5. REITs and MLPs - Mortgage Investors
6. REITs and MLPs - Hybrids
HOI: No significant abnormal returns were earned by any 
of the portfolios in any information month.
The hypothesis may be stated in the following notational 
form:
HOI: Spfc = 0 for all 6pĵ
A separate F test was conducted for each of the six 
portfolios. For those portfolios found to be significant, 
a separate two-tail t-test was conducted on each Sp^. From 
the results of the t-tests, it can be determined whether 
the real estate capital markets adjusted to new
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information, and the information months in which each 
portfolio reacted to tax announcements can be identified.
For addressing the second specific research question 
and determining the market reaction to a slower write-off 
of depreciable assets, the sample firms were grouped into 
2 portfolios as indicated in Table 4.3. One portfolio 
comprises firms classified as equity investors; a second 
portfolio is made up of firms engaged in other activities.
TABLE 4.3
Portfolio Composition for Hypotheses 2 and 3
Firm Classifications
Hypothesis Comprising Each Portfolio
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2




3 Corporations REITs and MLPs
(Non-corporation*)
* The term "non-corporations" is used to indicate that 
the entities are not taxed as regular corporations.
The following null hypothesis is presented for 
testing:
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H02: No significant difference exists between abnormal
returns of the equity investor portfolio and those 
of the non-equity investor portfolio for any 
information period.
In notational form, the hypothesis may be stated as 
follows:
H02: = (S2k for all k
where subscripts 1 and 2 denote equity investor portfolios 
and non-equity portfolios, respectively. The traditional 
theory would predict a decline in the market values of 
equity investors relative to other real estate firms as a 
result of slower write-off of depreciation. An overall F 
test was conducted to determine if there is a significant 
difference between the two equations representing the two 
portfolios. A separate F-test of the equality of the 
coefficients was then conducted for each set of If
H02 is rejected for any information month and the 
significant difference is of the predicted sign, the 
evidence would provide support for the traditional theory 
that slower write-off of depreciation results in a 
downward adjustment by the capital market concerning 
expected after-tax earnings and, consequently, the value 
of affected firms. Rejection of H02 with a significant 
difference of a positive sign as predicted by the F-A-K 
theory would support the F-A-K theory. Failure to reject 
would not be inconsistent with the assertion that the
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change in depreciation of structures had no differential 
effect on the real estate capital markets.
The third specific research question relates to the 
change in firm value resulting from changes in marginal 
tax rates for corporations. To determine whether the 
market value of corporations increased relative to real 
estate firms not taxed at the entity level, two portfolios 
were compared. As indicated in Table 4.3, one portfolio 
is comprised of regular corporations; the other is made up 
of entities not taxed as regular corporations (i.e., 
REITs and MLPs). The following hypothesis is presented:
H03: No significant difference exists between abnormal
returns of the corporation portfolio and those of 
the non-corporation portfolio for any information 
period.
In notational form, the hypothesis may be stated as 
follows:
H03: 6^  = S2k £°r
where the subscripts 1 and 2 represent the corporation 
portfolio and the non-corporation portfolio, respectively. 
The traditional theory suggests that the market would have 
made an upward adjustment in its expectations regarding 
after-tax earnings of regular corporations relative to 
non-corporations as a result of information regarding a 
decline in corporation tax rates. For testing the 
hypotheses, an overall F test was conducted to determine
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if there is a significant difference between the two 
equations representing the two portfolios. A separate F 
test was then conducted for each set of If H03 is
rejected for any information month and the significant 
difference is of the sign predicted by the traditional 
theory, evidence would be adduced that the market reacted 
to information in that particular month by translating the 
lower tax rates into higher relative firm values in the 
real estate industry. Such reaction would provide support 
for the traditional theory.
If H03 is rejected and the sign of the significant 
difference is not as predicted by the traditional theory, 
the evidence would suggest that the F-A-K theory is 
appropriate. Failure to reject would not be inconsistent 
with the assertion that the change in corporate tax rates 
caused no differential effects between corporations and 
other entity forms (i.e., entities not taxed as regular 
coporations).
Summary
The traditional theory suggests that the market 
adjusts to information concerning changes in tax policy 
that alters the cash flows or tax liabilities of 
taxpayers. Slower write-off of the cost of structures 
would result, ceteris paribus, in a devaluation of 
securities of firms that hold equity interests in real 
estate. A decrease in corporate tax rates would cause an
increase in the value of corporations relative to other 
real estate organizational forms. The procedures 
described in this chapter are designed to test whether the 
real estate capital markets reacted to certain changes 
made be TRA '86 an a manner consistent with the 
traditional theory.
The traditional theory is of primary concern in this 
study. However, significant results contrary to those 
predicted by the traditional theory would lend support to 
the P-A-K theory that an inverse relationship exists 
between tax incentives and the market value of the firm.
CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the empirical results of the 
effect of announcements concerning TRA '86 on the real 
estate capital markets. The statistical findings are 
presented in five sections. First, the selected sample is 
briefly described. Second, shift in parameter estimates 
are discussed. Third, the presence of assimilation 
effects on announcement dates is presented. Finally, 
significant differences in excess returns among 
portfolios are reviewed, followed by a discussion of 
mitigating and confounding effects.
Selected Sample
Application of the criteria for sample selection 
discussed in Chapter 4 resulted in a total sample size of 
127 real estate firms.9 Fifty-four percent of the 
companies included in the sample are relatively large 
firms and their securities are traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange. The remaining 46 percent are smaller
9A list of the companies included in the sample is 
provided in Appendix A.
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companies whose stocks are traded on the American stock 
Exchange.
Table 5.1 presents a tabulation of the number of 
firms in each portfolio classification. For the first 
stage of the statistical analysis, firms were classified 
according to both their organizational form and their 
functional activity form. Based on Realty Stock Review 
classifications and SIC codes, 41 of the sample firms were 
classified as building and development (B&D) corporations, 
15 as equity corporations, and eight as mortgage 
corporations. Twenty-eight firms were classified as 
equity REITs or MLPs, 23 as mortgage REITs or MLPs, and 12 
as hybrid REITs or MLPs.
For the second stage of the analysis, firms were 
first classified as either equity or non-equity companies 
depending on their functional activity. Forty-three real 
estate companies in the sample are classified as equity 
companies. The remaining 84 companies are non-equity 
companies.
All firms in the sample were subsequently 
reclassified as to their organizational form, either as 
corporations or as non-corporations. The corporation 
portfolio includes only those companies organized as 
regular C corporations. The non-corporation portfolio 
comprises REITs and MLPs. As indicated in the tabulation,
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TABLE 5.1








Equity REITs and MLPs 28
Mortgage REITs and MLPs 23






the corporation portfolio contains 64 firms; the non­
corporation portfolio contains 63 firms.
Shifts in Regression Equations
The switching regression technique was applied to 
identify a possible shift in the regression equation 
associated with each portfolio. The results are shown in 
Table 5.2. No hypotheses concerning the significance of 
the shift in either the intercept of the regression line 
or the beta coefficient were proposed. It may be noted, 
however, that during the sample period, eight of the ten 
portfolios did experience a significant shift in the beta 
coefficient. In most cases the shift in the portfolio 
regression equation occurred during the first quarter of 
1983. The regression equation shifts appear to generally 
correspond to announcements of expected growth in GNP and 
increased real estate activity due to declining interest 
rates. In no case did the month in which the shift 
occurred coincide with a month in which an announcement 
concerning TRA '86 was made public. Consequently, it 
cannot be concluded from this study that the shift in the 
systematic risk of the portfolios may be attributed to 
information regarding TRA '86. The significance of such 
shifts in the beta coefficient can be related only to 
other factors in the market.
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TABLE 5.2








B&D Corp. Mar.. 1983 -0.197 -0.93
Equity Corp. Jan. 1983 -0.424
**Hr-*H1
Mortgage Corp. Aug. 1983 -0.531 -1.97**
Equity Non-corp. Apr. 1983 -0.319 -2.75*
Mortgage Non-corp Mar. 1983 -0.372 -2.56**
Hybrid Non-corp. Apr. 1986 -0.666 -3.64*
Equity Firms Jan. 1983 -0.341 -2.65*
Non-Equity Firms Mar. 1983 -0,327 -2.27**
All Corporations Mar. 1983 -0.341 -2.12**
All Non-corp. Mar. 1983 -0.249 -2.31**
* = significant at the 1% level.
** = significant at the 5% level. 
*** = significant at the 10% level.
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Assimilation Effects
The first hypothesis relates to the propensity of 
the markets to assimilate information concerning changes 
in tax law. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was 
used to obtain the coefficient estimates, and a Durbin- 
Watson test was conducted to determine if the variables 
were serially correlated. The results of the Durbin- 
Watson indicated the presence of autoregressivity in the 
returns for some of the portfolios. Autocorrelation 
affects the efficiency of the parameter estimates and 
biases the estimate of the standard error. Consequently, 
the results of the t-tests are not valid (Johnson 1963, 
p.179) .
To correct for autocorrelation, the Yule-Walker 
procedure of variable transformation was utilized. The 
Yule-Walker is a generalized least squares method which 
uses OLS residuals to estimate the covariances across 
observations.10 This two-step full transformation 
procedure may appropriately be used to correct for 
autoregression in both large and small sample sizes (Park 
and Mitchell 1980). For those portfolios that exhibited 
autoregressivity, the values of the transformed variables 
were used for conducting tests of significance.
10See Gallant and Goebel (1976) for a computational 
explanation of the Yule-Walker estimation.
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In order to determine if the real estate markets 
react to information regarding tax law changes, an F test 
of significance was first conducted for each portfolio. 
As shown in Table 5.3, all the F statistics are 
significant. Next, t-tests for the presence of 
assimilation effects were conducted on the coefficient for 
each information date for each of six portfolios. The 
coefficient estimates are presented for each portfolio and 
each announcement date in Table 5.4. The t-statistic is 
shown in parentheses below the corresponding parameter 
estimate.
The first indication of a market reaction to 
possible changes in tax law occurred when the Bradley- 
Gephardt tax overhaul plan was introduced in August 1982.
TABLE 5.3
Tests of Significance on Individual Portfolios
Portfolio F Value p Value
B&D Corporation 21.83 .0001
Equity Corporation 5.54 .0001
Mortgage Corporation 6.73 .0001
Equity Non-corporation 8.01 . 0001
Mortgage Non-corporation 7.72 .0001
Hybrid Non-corporation 6.92 . 0001
TABLE 5.4
Tests of Information Period Coefficients 




Period Event B & D Eauitv Mortaacte Equity Mortcjacre Hybrid
Bradley-Gephardt .0644 — j 0819 -.0101 -.0222 .0103 .0349
Proposal (1.82)*** (-1.55) (-0.19) (-0.95) (0.34) (1.39)
Kemp-Kasten -.0458 .0334 .0041 -.0168 . 0023 .0236
Proposal (-1.46) (0.68) (0.08) (-0.77) (0.08) (0.96)
Treasury I .0318 .0141 -.0119 .0207 .0372 .0378
Proposal (1.01) (0.29) (-0.22) (0.94) (1.35) (1.57)
President's -.0209 .0079 .1080 -.0018 .6171 -.0160
Proposal (-0.66) (0.16) (2.04)** (-0.08) (0.62) (-0.66)
TRA *86, .0327 -.0154 .0080 -.0207 -.0520 -.0672
Ways & Means (0.95) (-0.31) (0.15) (-0.92) (-1.85)*** (-2.61)*'
TRA '86 .0173 -.0079 -.0418 -.0136 .0346 -.0203
Full House (0.49) (-0.16) (-0.79) (-0.60) (1.23) (-0.79)
TRA '86 -.0165 -.0583 -.0122 -.0239 -.0097 -.0362






B & D Eouitv Mortaaae Eauitv Mortaaae Hvbrid
TRA '86 -.0726 .0307 .0478 .0489 .0031 .0593
Full Senate (-1.91)*** (0.62) (0.88) (2.19)** (0.11) (2.18)**
TRA ’86 -.0732 -.0031 .0130 .0060 .0523 .0431
Conference (-1.81)*** (-0.06) (0.24) (0.27) (1.84)*** (1.59)
TRA '86 .0264 .0184 -.0497 .0091 .0021 -.0114
House & Senate (0.70) (0.37) (-0.92) (0.39) (0.07) (-0.38)
TRA '86 -.0181 ,0026 .0325 -.0080 .0167 .0243
Enactment (-0.49) (0.05) (0.60) (-0.35) (0.59) (0.87)
OBRA '87 .0872 .0055 .0435 -.0646 -.0135 -.2266
House (1.69)*** (0.09) (0.59) (-2.19)** (0.37) (-4.25)*
OBRA '87 -.0531 -.0609 -.0472 -.0088 -.0359 -.0208
Senate & (-1.30) (-1.21) (-0.85) (-0.38) (-1.23) (-0.74)
Conference
* = significant at the 1% level.
** = significant at the 5% level. 
*** = significant at the 10% level.
Note. All significance levels are for two-tailed tests of the null hypothesis. V D00
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For that test period, the abnormal return coefficient of 
the B&D corporation portfolio differs positively from zero 
at the 10 percent significance level. No other 
significant market reaction was observed in any of the 
portfolios until May 1985 when the President's tax reform 
proposal was unveiled. One possible explanation for the 
this lack of significance is that the markets placed a low 
probability on the occurrence of a change in tax law. 
Another possibility is that the markets did expect changes 
in the tax law, but due to the variations in the
different tax reform proposals, there was no consensus as 
to the direction of such change. If so, differing 
opinions among investors could have resulted in offsetting 
reactions in the market such that an overall impact was 
not measurable.
During the month of the announcement of the
President's tax proposal, one portfolio showed a 
significant abnormal return. The information coefficient 
of the mortgage corporation portfolio for May 1985 is
barely significant at the five percent level. A 
combination of several provisions embodied in the
President's proposal would be likely to have contributed 
to the positive market reaction relative to mortgage 
corporations. First, the proposed reduction in corporate 
tax rates and the repeal of the alternative minimum tax 
for corporations both may be considered as positive
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factors affecting after-tax earnings of the mortgage 
corporation. Second, the tax plan generally would have 
allowed corporations a dividends paid deduction equal to 
10 percent of dividends paid to shareholders. This 
deduction also would increase after-tax earnings. These 
factors, taken together with the President's endorsement 
of the tax plan, provide a plausible explanation of the 
positive market reaction in May 1985.
Tests of significance on the information coefficient 
for the month in which the Ways and Means Committee voted 
affirmatively on the House version of TRA '86 indicate 
that negative abnormal returns were earned by two 
portfolios in that period. The information coefficient of 
the mortgage non-corporation portfolio (REITs and MLPs) is 
negative and differs from zero at the ten percent level of 
significance. The coefficient of the hybrid non­
corporation portfolio for November 1985 is significantly 
negative at the five percent level.
Prior to the Ways and Means Committee vote, the 
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts had 
been lobbying for relaxed rules governing the 
requirements for REIT status and the ongoing REIT 
operations. However, the bill passed by the Ways and 
Means Committee did not embody provisions for changes in 
the rules for REITs. If the REIT market had expected 
positive changes in tax law relative to REITs, that
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expectation would probably have been incorporated into 
the price of REIT shares. When the Ways and Means 
Committee then failed to include those REIT provisions in 
the bill, the response of the non-corporation market would 
likely have been negative.
Tests of significance failed to indicate that any of 
the portfolios earned abnormal returns during the month of 
December 1985 when TRA '86 was passed by the full House or 
during May 1986 when the Senate Finance Committee passed 
its version of the tax reform bill. The passage of the 
bill by the House was probably fully anticipated by the 
markets and, consequently, the House vote would not result 
in abnormal market returns. The lack of significance for 
the month of the Finance Committee vote may be due to the 
differences between the House and the Senate versions of 
the tax reform bill. Such differences could have caused 
uncertainty in the markets regarding the final legislative 
outcome and prevented investors from acting on the new 
information. Another probable reason for the lack of 
significant results during these periods is that most 
informed analysts still thought fundamental tax reform was 
impossible.
The greatest number of significant results occur 
around the time of the full Senate vote and the Conference 
Committee agreement on TRA '86. By that time, the market
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had evidently begun to place a greater probability on 
eventual tax reform.
The results of the analysis for the information 
month (June 1986) in which the full Senate passed its tax 
reform bill indicate that three portfolios earned abnormal 
returns. The information coefficient for B&D corporations 
is negative and significant at the ten percent level. The 
information coefficients for the hybrid non-corporation 
portfolio and the equity non-corporation portfolio are 
positive and significant at the five percent level. Some 
remaining uncertainty concerning the eventual outcome of 
Congressional action toward tax reform may account for the 
mixed results in the market in the period surrounding the 
Senate vote.
The results of the tests of significance for the 
month in which the Conference Committee voted on the final 
version of TRA '86 indicate that the B&D corporation 
portfolio again earned a negative abnormal return. The 
information coefficient is significant at the ten percent 
level, indicating that the market perceived the changes in 
tax law as being detrimental to the building and 
development industry. The information coefficient for the 
mortgage non-corporation portfolio differs positively from 
zero at the ten percent significance level. Why this 
portfolio was affected positively by the Committee vote is 
not clear since no provision was contained in the bill
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that should have impacted uniquely the mortgage non­
corporation portfolio.
The analysis does not indicate a market reaction 
during the month of the passage of TRA '86 by the full 
House and Senate nor during the month in which the bill 
was signed into law. It is plausible that, following the 
passage of the bill by the Conference Committee, the 
market anticipated the subsequent events. If so, no 
significant abnormal returns would be indicated for those 
months.
In October 1987, when the House passed its version 
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, three portfolios 
exhibited significant abnormal returns. The information 
coefficient of B&D corporation portfolio is positive at 
the ten percent significance level. The equity non­
corporation portfolio and the hybrid non-corporation 
portfolio had negative information coefficients for 
October 1987 at the five percent and" the one percent 
significance levels, respectively.
Caution must be exercised in interpreting the 
results of the tests of significance for this information 
period. The stock market crash which occurred in the same 
month in which the bill was passed by the House probably 
had a more substantial effect on the market than did any 
legislative action. Moreover, the bill did not contain 
provisions that were predicted to impact substantially the
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real estate industry. Consequently, the significant
results obtained from the t-tests cannot necessarily be 
attributed to the passage of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act.
Cross-Sectional Differences
This section reports the empirical results of 
simultaneous estimations of Equation 1.2 for examining 
the differential effects of announcements concerning 
changes in cost recovery rules for real property and of 
those concerning changes in tax rates for corporations. 
The results of the statistical tests for determining
significant differences between excess returns of 
comparative portfolios are reported in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, 
respectively. The reported F statistics are tests of 
equality on the values of the information period 
coefficients. Each statistic is distributed with 1 and 
134=N(T-K) degrees of freedom, where N=2 is the number of 
equations, T=84 is the number of time periods, and K=17 is 
the number of independent variables in each equation.
Differential Effects of Changes in Cost Recovery for 
Real Property. The second hypothesis relates to the
differential effects of announcements regarding changes in 
depreciation periods and methods for real property. For 
comparative purposes, all firms in the sample were 
included in either the equity portfolio or the non-equity
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portfolio. The traditional theory predicts that for those 
announcements regarding tax law changes whereby the cost 
recovery of real property would occur more slowly than 
under pre-existing law, the coefficients representing 
abnormal returns of the equity portfolio will 
algebraically be smaller than those of the non-equity 
portfolio. All announcement periods in this study 
indicate a slower cost recovery except those regarding the 
Kemp-Kasten bill and OBRA. The overall F test was 
significant at the one percent level. The results of the 
individual F tests are presented in Table 5.5.
The null hypothesis of no significant difference 
between the information period coefficients of the equity 
portfolio and those of the non-equity portfolio was 
rejected at the one-percent level for one of the 
announcement dates. During the month of August 1982, when 
the Bradley-Gephardt tax plan was introduced, the excess 
return coefficient of the equity portfolio is -.06299, 
while the coefficient of the non-equity portfolio is 
.04301. The negative direction of the abnormal return 
coefficient for the equity portfolio is consistent with 
the traditional theory. Moreover, in further support of 
the traditional theory, the algebraic difference between 
the information coefficients of the two portfolios is 
negative. For all information periods subsequent to the 
announcement of the Bradley-Gephardt plan, there was no
TABLE 5.5
Tests of Significant Differences Between 














Gephardt Tax Plan -.06299 .04301
Introduction of Kemp-
Kasten Tax Plan .00031 -.01490
Introduction of
Treasury-I Tax Plan .01877 .01401
Introduction of
President's Tax Plan .00374 .01130
Passage of TRA *85 by
Ways and Means Committee -.02242 -.00157
Passage of TRA ’85
by House -.01645 .00634
Passage of TRA *86
by Finance Committee -.03788 -.02968
Passage of TRA *86































Agreement on TRA '86 .00477 -.01761 + 0.516 .516
Passage of TRA '86 
by House and Senate .01379 .01692 - 0.008 .929
TRA '86 Signed 
by President -.00888 -.01168 + 0. 007 .935
Passage of OBRA *87 
by House -.02755 .02795 - 1.511 .221
Senate Passage and 
Conference Committee 
Agreement on OBRA '87 -.02928 -.05160 + 0.422 .517
A negative sign indicates that the equity portfolio coefficient is 
algebraically smaller than that of the non-equity portfolio. A positive sign 
indicates that the equity portfolio coefficient is algebraically greater than 
that of the non-equity portfolio.
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significant difference in the information coefficient of 
the equity and the non-equity portfolios for any 
information month. However, in support of the traditional 
theory, the sign of the difference between the abnormal 
returns of the two portfolios, though not statistically 
significant, is negative for six of the announcement 
periods.
For the month in which the Kemp-Kasten bill was 
announced, the equity portfolio excess return is greater 
algebraically than that of the non-equity portfolio. 
However, the original version of the bill proposed no 
change in cost recovery methods. Consequently, the 
significant results in that information period cannot 
necessarily be attributed specifically to a market 
response to the Kemp-Kasten bill.
Differential Effects of Chancres in Corporate Tax 
Rates. The third hypothesis concerns the differential 
effects of announcements regarding changes in the taxation 
of corporations. In order to compare the estimated excess 
returns across groups, regular corporations in the sample 
of firms were placed into one portfolio. A second 
portfolio contained all other sample firms. The 
traditional theory predicts that, for each test period 
except those related to OBRA, estimated excess returns 
will be positive for the corporation portfolio and 
algebraically greater than those of the non-corporation
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portfolio. The overall F test was significant at the one 
percent level. The results of the individual F tests are 
presented in Table 5.6.
The null hypothesis of no significant difference 
between the corporation portfolio and the non-corporation 
portfolio is rejected at the five percent level for two 
information periods. The results indicate that in August
1986, when the compromise tax bill for TRA ’86 received 
the approval of the Joint Conference Committee, the 
excess return coefficient of the corporation portfolio was 
-.0448. The excess return coefficient of the non­
corporation portfolio was .0289. The direction of the 
difference in excess returns, however, is not consistent 
with the traditional theory, but is as predicted by the 
F-A-K theory. In four other information months, the 
differences in the excess returns of the two portfolios, 
though not statistically significant, are of the sign 
predicted by the traditional theory.
The second significant difference between the excess 
returns of the two portfolios occurred during October
1987, the month in which the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1987 was approved by the House. However, caution 
should be exercised in interpreting this result. It is 
probable that the sudden and dramatic downturn of the 
stock market, which occurred in the same month as the 
OBRA '87 approval by the House, rendered the results of
TABLE 5.6
Tests of Significant Differences Between the 













Introduction of Bradley- 
Gephardt Tax Plan .02690
Introduction of Kemp-
Kasten Tax Plan -.01049
Introduction of
Treasury-I Tax Plan .00978
Introduction of
President's Tax Plan .00501
Passage of TRA '85 by
Ways and Means Committee .01611
Passage of TRA '85
by House -.00399
Passage of TRA ’86
•by Finance Committee -.02822









































Agreement on TRA ’86 -.04482 .02885 - 5.164 .025
Passage of TRA '86 
by House and Senate .02519 .00343 + 0.440 .508
TRA '86 Signed 
by President -.01922 -.00122 - 0.311 .578
Passage of OBRA '87 
by House .05551 -.05366 + 6.555 .012
Senate Passage and 
Conference Committee 
Agreement on OBRA '87 -.06134 -.02385 - 1.335 . 250
* A positive sign indicates that the corporation portfolio coefficient is 
algebraically greater than that of the non-corporation portfolio. A negative 
sign indicates that the corporation portfolio coefficient is algebraically 
smaller than that of the non-corporation portfolio.
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s t a t i s t i c a l  tests for this i n f o r mation month 
uninterpretable. The differences between excess returns 
of the two portfolios earned during the month of the 
market crash cannot necessarily be attributed to 
Congressional action concerning OBRA '87.
Confounding and Mitigating Effects
There are several possible explanations for the low 
level of significance found in the analysis of the 
differential effects for equity and non-equity portfolios 
and for corporation and non-corporation portfolios. One 
possibility is that the market fully anticipated, and 
reacted to, the information prior to the month in which 
the announcement actually occurred. A review of The Wall 
Street Journal in the month immediately prior to each 
announcement period indicates that, in some cases, the 
market did receive information regarding the probable 
results of upcoming legislative action. Under these 
circumstances, the reaction of the market may have 
occurred in small degrees over the period of time in which 
numerous bits of information were released. Consequently, 
the market reaction may not be measurable in the month of 
the Congressional announcement.
A second possible cause for insignificant results in 
some information periods relates to the scope of the tax 
law revision. Many of the provisions of TRA *86 may have 
had opposing effects on the real estate capital markets.
One such example is the decrease in the top marginal tax 
rates for individuals which occurred simultaneously with 
the reduction in corporate tax rates. If, on average, 
corporations and non-corporations have the same earnings 
payout ratio, any change in tax rates for individuals
should impact the market value of the two groups equally. 
However, an examination of the earnings payout history of 
the two portfolios over the time period of this study 
reveals that the payout ratio of the non-corporation 
portfolio has been more than two and one-half times 
greater than that of the corporation portfolio. With
lower tax rates, individuals’ preferences for taxable 
dividends may have increased. Consequently, the demand 
for those "higher-dividend" investments would increase, 
thereby driving up the value of the non-corporation 
portfolio relative to the corporation portfolio. in
summary, while the decrease in corporate rates may drive
up the market value of the corporation portfolio, the 
decrease in individual rates may force the value downward 
relative to the non-corporation portfolio. The unequal 
impact of the reduction in individual tax rates on the 
market value of corporations and non-corporations could 
have a confounding effect resulting in insignificant 
differences between those two portfolios.
CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides a summary of the examination 
of the impact of legislative action surrounding TRA '86 on 
the real estate capital markets and discusses conclusions 
drawn from the results of the statistical analysis of the 
data. The chapter includes four sections. First, the 
research project and the procedures for statistical 
analysis are summarized. Second, conclusions derived from 
the empirical results are presented. Third, the scope and 
limitations of the study are discussed. Finally, some 
suggestions for future research are given.
Summary
Two opposing theories are enunciated in the 
literature concerning the impact of changes in the tax 
law. The traditional theory suggests that a positive 
relationship exists between tax incentives for businesses 
and the market value of the firm. According to this 
theory, tax law changes that provide businesses with 
incentives to increase capital investments stimulate 
expansion of the firm which, in turn, increases the firm’s 
market value. On the contrary, the F-A-K theory holds
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that a converse relationship exists between tax benefits 
and firm value. Newly-enacted provisions that encourage 
increased capital investments generally apply only to 
newly-acquired capital and, thus, drive down the value of 
existing capital. The consequence, as interpreted by the 
F-A-K theory, is a decline in the market value of the 
firm.
A number of simulation studies have been conducted 
which tend to refute the traditional theory and support 
the F-A-K theory. However, some empirical works have 
found evidence that the traditional theory is appropriate 
for explaining the behavior of the capital markets when 
tax law changes. This study attempts to determine if the 
behavior of the real estate capital markets during 
legislation regarding TRA '86 provides support for the 
traditional theory.
To determine whether the value of the firm changed 
in response to announcements concerning TRA '86, a sample 
of 127 real estate firms was grouped into six portfolios 
having different entity and operational characteristics. 
The portfolio return was modeled by a regression equation 
containing intervention dummy variables for capturing 
abnormal returns in those months in which new information 
was believed to reach the market. Using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression, the excess portfolio returns 
were then identified for those information periods, and
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their level of significance determined by the use of t- 
tests. The purpose of the OLS procedure was to determine 
if the market assimilated the tax reform information.
To investigate the differential impact of the 
legislation across portfolios, the sample firms were again 
grouped into portfolios, first according to the nature of 
their operation, and second by organizational structure. 
The intervention model was again used. A generalized least 
squares (GLS) regression technique, known as seemingly 
unrelated regression, and F tests were employed for 
examining the cross-sectional differences in returns. For 
both OLS and GLS regression, a switching regression 
technique was utilized to improve the fit of the 
regression line.
Conclusions
The. first null hypothesis tested in this study is 
that no significant abnormal returns were earned by any of 
the portfolios in any information month. As indicated in 
Table 6.1, this hypothesis is rejected; t tests at six 
i nform a t i o n  periods (representing five separate 
portfolios) were significant at levels ranging from one to 
ten percent. In total, there were twelve occurrences of 
significant excess returns, nine of which appear to be 
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The results provide some evidence that the real 
estate capital markets do respond to information 
concerning changes in tax law. The findings suggest that 
the hybrid non-corporation portfolio and the B & D 
corporation portfolio were affected in more instances than 
were the other portfolios. Perhaps the nature of their 
activities causes these groups to be more sensitive to tax 
law changes. Equity corporations seem to have been
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impacted the least. This result is contrary to the 
expectation that those announcements regarding changes in 
real property depreciation rules would adversely affect 
firms that hold real property for the production of 
income.
The greatest number of portfolios showing excess 
returns occurred in the month in which the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA '87) was passed by the 
House and Senate. During that same month, however, the 
stock market experienced its most severe decline since the 
market crash of 1929. Consequently, the behavior of the 
real estate capital markets in that information period 
cannot necessarily be attributed to changes in tax law.
The second null hypothesis tested is that no 
significant difference exists between abnormal returns of 
the equity portfolio and the non-equity portfolio for any 
information period. Findings of significance in which the 
excess returns of the equity portfolio are less than those 
of the non-equity portfolio provide support for the 
traditional theory. The third hypothesis is that no 
significant difference exists between the corporation 
portfolio and the non-corporation portfolio for any 
information period. Support for the traditional theory is 
provided by significant differences between portfolios 
whereby the excess returns of the corporation portfolio
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TABLE 6.2
INCIDENTS OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CROSS SECTIONAL 
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are greater than those of the non-corporation portfolio. 
Table 6.2 provides a listing of those events and 
portfolio pairs wherein significant cross-sectional 
differences are indicated.
The results provide only minimal support for the 
traditional theory. In the month in which the Bradley- 
Gephardt tax plan was announced, the excess return 
coefficient of the equity portfolio exhibited a 
significantly smaller value than did that of the non­
equity portfolio. The behavior of the capital markets in 
that information period is consistent with that predicted 
by the traditional theory. In the month in which the 
Senate voted on TRA *86, the excess return coefficient of
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the non-equity portfolio was algebraically greater than 
that of the equity portfolio. This result is inconsistent 
with the traditional theory.
The month in which the Joint Conference Committee 
approved a compromise bill, the corporation and non­
corporation portfolios earned significantly different 
excess returns. However, the traditional theory suggests 
that the abnormal return of the corporation portfolio at 
that time should have been positive. It was not, nor was 
its value algebraically greater than that of the non­
corporation portfolio. Consequently, the market reaction 
in that information period does not support the
traditional theory but rather is consistent with the F-A-K 
theory.
The corporation portfolio did earn a positive excess 
return greater than that of the non-corporation portfolio 
in the month of the passage of OBRA '87 by the House and 
Senate. However, because of the instability in the stock 
market during that same month, it is unclear whether the 
market reaction is in response to Congressional action or 
to other factors. Consequently, the increase in firm 
values for corporations may not necessarily be taken as 
support for the traditional theory.
Scope and Limitations
This study examined and analyzed the relationship
between specific provisions the Tax Reform Act of 1986
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and the real estate capital markets. Consequently, the 
results and conclusions may not be extended to other 
markets and other changes in tax law without reservation. 
Moreover, the sample companies used for study were drawn 
from the population of publicly-traded firms listed by the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and the 
sample selection criteria could have resulted in a 
selection bias. Therefore, caution also should be used in 
applying the results to other groups of companies.
Several economic assumptions under which this study ■ 
was carried out are worthy of note. First, it was 
assumed that the markets operate efficiently in the semi­
strong form. Second, a linear relationship is assumed to 
exist between the expected earnings of the firm and the 
firm's stock prices. Third, the assumption is made that 
the market moves toward a new equilibrium following an 
event that creates disequilibrium in the economy. While 
empirical support for these assumptions is contained in 
the literature (Beaver 1981), the results of this study
depend upon their degree of validity and should be
interpreted within the context of these restraints.
Another assumption made in this study relates to the 
timing of the market response to new information. Any 
excess returns resulting from each market adjustment are 
assumed to occur in the same month in which the
information becomes public. To the extent that the market
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reacts more slowly or has access to information before it 
is made publicly available, the information may be biased.
The focus of this study is on TRA '86 provisions 
relating to depreciation of real property and corporate 
income tax. However, it is possible that othSr provisions 
of the Act may have impacted the markets. For example, 
the change in tax rates for individuals is a provision 
which may have broad-reaching implications for the capital 
markets. This study assumes that the change in tax rates 
for individuals is reflected in the over-all market 
returns. Interpretations of the statistical results 
should be made with these constraints in mind.
Finally, the economic and political environment 
during the time period for this study could have had a 
unique impact on the results of this study. Consequently, 
the results may not be generalizable to periods that are 
not economically and politically similar.
Suggestions for Future Research
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of 
master limited partnerships (MLPs) formed for the purpose 
of investing in real property. In the past, the limited 
availability of share price data for MLPs has deterred 
studies of the relationship between changes in such prices 
and changes in tax law. The growth in the market for 
publicly-traded partnership shares, however, has 
encouraged the collection and dissemination of MLP share
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price information. Both the 1986 Act and OBRA '87 
contained provisions for restricting deductions for losses 
on passive income investments such as limited partnership 
shares. As an extension to this work, researchers may 
examine the relationship between share prices and passive 
loss rules.
Another area of interest for future research is the 
impact of tax law changes on industries other than real 
estate. The results of such studies could be beneficial 
for Congressional decision making. Researchers may 
investigate the impact of certain provisions of TRA '86 
that relate to specific segments of the economy, such as 
agricultural, oil and gas, or regulated investment 
companies.
Because of the post hoc nature of stock market 
studies, the methodological techniques that are currently 
used are not always able to distinguish between the 
effects of changes in tax law and effects of extraneous 
variables in the economy. Consequently, results may be 
biased. Future researchers may attempt to refine the 
methodology for measuring the market effects of changes in 
tax law so that extraneous variables have a smaller 
impact on the results of the studies.
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APPENDIX A 
List of Companies Included in the Study
No. Company Name
1. Americana Hotel & Realty Corp.
2. B R T Realty Trust
3. Beverly Investment Properties, Inc.
4. California Real Estate Investment Trust
5. Cenvill Investments, Inc.
6. Copley Property, Inc.
7. Countrywide Mortgage Investments, Inc.
8. Del Val Financial Corp.
9. Duke Realty Investment, Inc.
10. E Q K Realty Investments, 1
11. Eastgroup Properties
12. Federal Realty Investment Trust
13. First United Real Estate Eq. & Mtg. Investments
14. Gould Investments Trust
15. Gould Investments, LP
16. Guild Mortgage Investments, Inc.
17. H R E Properties
18. Hailwood Group, Inc
19. Harris Teeter Properties, Inc.
20. Health Care REIT, Inc.
21. Health Care Property Investments, Inc.
22. Healthvest
23. Hmg/Courtland Properties, LTD.
24. Hotel Properties, Inc.
25. Hotel Investments Trust
26. Hovnanian Enterprises, Inc.
27. I C M  Property Investors, Inc.
28. International Income Property, Inc.
29. IRT Property Co.
30. Johnstown Consolidated Realty Trust
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31. Koger Properties, Inc.
3 2. Koger Company
33. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc.
34. Leisure & Technology, Inc.
35. Lennar Corporation
36. Levitt Corporation
37. Lincoln N C Realty Fund, Inc.
38. Linpro Specified Properties
39. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corporation
40. Lomas & Nettleton Mortgage Investments
41. M D C Holdings, Inc.
42. M S A  Realty Corp. Lomas Mortgage Corp.
43. Massmutual Mortgage and Realty Investments
44. Mission West Properties
45. Mony Real Estate Investments
46. Mortgage Growth Investments
4 7. Mortgage Investments Plus, Inc.
48. Mortgage & Realty Trust
49. National Enterprises, Inc.
50. New Plan Reality Trust
51. Newhall Investment Properties
52. One Liberty Properties, Inc.
52. Oriole Homes Corporation
54. Oriole Homes Corporation, II
55. Painewebber Residential Reality
56. Patten Corporation
57. Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust
58. Perini Investment Properties, Inc.
59. Pittsburgh & W Va RR
60. Presidential Realty Corp.
61. Presidential Realty Corp., New
62. Property Capital Trust
63. Prudential Realty Trust
64. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc.
65. Radice Corporation
66. Realty Refund Trust
67. Realty South Investments, Inc.
68. Redman Industries, Inc.
69. REIT America, Inc.
70. Residential Mortgage Investments, Inc.
71. River Oaks Industries, Inc.
72. Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc.
73. Ryan Homes, Inc.
74. Ryland Group, Inc.
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74. Ryland Group, Inc.
75. Santa Anita Reality Enterprises
76. Security Capital Corporation, Del
77. Skyline Corporation
78. Southwest Reality, Ltd.
79. Standard Pacific Corporation
80. Starrett Housing Corporation
81. Storage Equities, Inc.
82. Toll Brothers, Inc.
83. Trammell Crow Real Estate Investments
84. Turner Equity Investments, Inc.
85. Unicorp America Corporation, New
86. Union VY Corporation
87. United States Home Corporation
88. Vyquest, Inc.
89. Washington Homes, Inc.
90. Washington Real Estate Investment Trust
91. Webb Del E Investment Properties, Inc.
92. Wedgestone Financial
93. Weingarten Realty, Inc.
94. Wells Fargo Mortgage & Equity Trust
95. Western Investment Real Estate Trust
96. Winthrop Insured Mortgage Investors, II
97. Zimmer Corporation
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